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Résumé 
 
La Bosnie-Herzégovine est sous supervision internationale depuis 1995. Les principaux acteurs 
de cette communauté internationale soit l’Union Européenne (UE) et le Bureau du Haut-
Représentant à la Communauté Internationale (OHR) ont exprimé à de nombreuses reprises leur 
intention de transformer la mission internationale en s’éloignant du pouvoir discrétionnaire du 
OHR en le remplaçant par la perspective d’intégration offerte par l’UE. Malgré les bonnes 
intentions, cette transition semble être dans une impasse. Depuis 2006, l’organisation et la 
distribution des responsabilités au sein de la communauté internationale sont restées inchangées. 
Ce mémoire s’intéresse à ces deux principaux acteurs et à leur rôle dans l’impasse. L’objectif est 
de tester trois cadres d’analyse soit le rationalisme, le constructivisme et la complexité des 
régimes pouvant expliquer cette impasse. En se basant sur des interviews avec des experts et des 
représentants des deux institutions, ce mémoire explore dans quelle mesure et dans quels 
contextes chaque cadre d’analyse est apte à expliquer le comportement des acteurs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mots-clefs: Bosnie-Herzégovine, relations internationales, complexité des régimes, impasse, 
rationalisme, constructivisme, Bureau du Haut-Représentant à la Communauté Internationale, 
Union Européenne.   
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Abstract 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been under international supervision since 1995. Key actors in the 
international community namely the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the European 
Union (EU) have expressed a desire to change the focus of this mission from one led by the OHR 
to one led by the EU. Despite the strong will of the international community to carry out this 
transition, it seems to have reached a deadlock. In the last few years, the arrangement of the 
international community has remained unchanged. This thesis focuses on these two main actors 
in this transition and their responsibility in the deadlock. This thesis tests three frameworks in 
order to explain this deadlock, specifically rationalism, constructivism, and regime complexity. 
Drawing on interviews with experts and officials working in the European Union and in the 
Office of the High Representative, this thesis explores the suitability of these frameworks for 
explaining these actors’ behaviours.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, international relations, regime complexity, deadlock, 
rationalism, constructivism, Office of the High Representative, European Union.  
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Introduction: Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Community 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina1 has been under international supervision since the end of the war in 
1995, when various institutions were enshrined in the Constitution of the country. These include 
the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which is in charge of the implementation of 
civilian aspects of the Dayton agreement. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
which handles military aspects, has been responsible for the Implementation Force (IFOR) and 
then for the Stabilization Force (SFOR). There is also the Organization of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which supervises the elections. The European Union (EU) 
through its Delegation and Special Representative (EUSR) has acquired more and more 
responsibilities in contrast to its limited involvement during the peace negotiations (Adebahr 
2009, 22). Since 2004, European Union Force Althea (EUFOR) has taken NATO’s place as the 
main military deployment force. Conversely, the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board 
(PICSB), which oversees the OHR, has been rather dormant, although it has never vanished. As 
Chandler (2006b) points out, the principal transition since the end of the war has been “from the 
ad hoc policy-ownership of self-selected members of the Peace Implementation Council to direct 
regulatory control under the aegis of the European Union” (Chandler 2006b, 18). In other words, 
the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina is slowly moving from Dayton to 
Brussels—or from the OHR to the EU.  
After a failed attempt at merging the functions of the High Representative with the Special 
Representative between 2002 and 2011, it was finally “the unsustainability of the double-hatting 
that led to the decision to detach the OHR from the EUSR” (Peter 2015, 139). This decision was 
                                                
1 In this thesis, the terms BiH and Bosnia will be use interchangeably to refer to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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taken because there were too many confusing and contradictory instructions coming from the two 
principals (PICSB and EU). In 2011, the roles were decoupled again.  
Since 2008, the OHR has set seven criteria for its closure, the 5+2 agenda. This plan includes 
criteria emanating from traditional OHR mandate mixed with EU integration issues. Besides, the 
OHR has been more and more reluctant to use its executive powers to impose its will on Bosnian 
politicians. The OHR is slowly receding before the EU. Meanwhile, the European Union has 
concentrated on Bosnia’s EU candidacy through numerous initiatives, the latest of which is the 
“Compact for Growth and Jobs” initiative launched in 2014. This initiative was established as a 
forum to connect scholars, business people, and government officials, and was designed to 
prioritize the problems of unemployment and corruption in BiH. The main outcome of this 
transition, at the present time, has involved the OHR shrinking in terms of size and preeminence 
(Peter 2015, 139) and the EU increasing its presence and multiplying its efforts and money. By 
the admission of the employees of both institutions, this shift has not been easy (interviews EM 
and RP).  
Moreover, since the end of High Representative Paddy Ashdown’s mandate in 2006, consensus 
about an effective transition strategy has steadily decreased among overseers both within the 
PICSB and among EU member-states (Peter 2015, 132). The prolongation of the transition phase 
and the absence of a plan for the international community to exit the country have even been 
described as a ‘non-strategy’ by Mateja Peter, a specialist in international administrations (Peter 
2015, 2). In the last eight years, the international community in Bosnia has reached a point of 
equilibrium. No change or exit strategy is foreseeable in the near future, which leads us to 
conclude that the transition is in a deadlock. While the international community made great 
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strides on issues like police reform and state-building during its first decade in Bosnia, it has been 
stalled between the implementation of peace, represented by the OHR, and the prospect of EU 
integration, and they have been unable to take any decisive steps in abolishing the OHR. This 
deadlock is the starting point of this thesis. Through a detailed description of the situation facing 
the international community, and by testing competing hypotheses, the objective is to understand 
why this deadlock happened, and, more importantly, why it is enduring.  
This thesis explores three explanatory systems: rationalism, constructivism, and regime 
complexity. The first two are not substantive theories for explaining the behaviour of key actors, 
meaning that they do not make any claims about the nature of the actors or their interactions. 
Regime complexity is a more recent trend in International Relations, and points to the importance 
of complex systems in affecting behaviour. First of all, a rationalist logic will be examined by 
looking at the individual, institutional, and international incentives that constitute actor interests 
and that encourage the continuation of the deadlock. Using game theory, the interests of key 
actors will be assessed, like in a negotiation setting, in order to explain why the deadlock persists. 
In this framework, the principals (i.e., PIC Steering board members and European Union 
institutions and member-states) are key actors. Second, a constructivist perspective will be tested. 
The idea behind this framework is that the HR and EU offices fell into some sort of bureaucratic 
autopilot and have been acting according to scripts emerging from their respective organizational 
cultures. In this context, we will assess how the identities developed by the international 
community affect the way they see and interact with Bosnia and Herzegovina and how this 
influences the perpetuation of the deadlock. Finally, we will look at regime complexity, which 
suggests that the regime complex of international institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
affected the behaviour of key actors. Complex institutional overlaps can encourage rivalries, 
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vetoes, and competition among international organizations and their principals. These hypotheses 
will be tested in turn. In so doing, we will discuss instances where the explanations are valid, 
while shedding light on any unresolved questions.   
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Chapter One: Contextual Overview, Literature Review, and Conceptual Framework 
 
The central question of this thesis is: why is there a deadlock? It is essential to describe the 
deadlock empirically and theoretically as well as the three explanatory systems proposed. This 
chapter endeavours to do so. The first section presents the context of the international 
intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina by describing the roles of the EU delegation, the Special 
Representative, and the Office of the High Representative. Then, we will briefly explain why 
these institutions can be considered the principal actors in this deadlock. Next, we will provide an 
overview of the deadlock itself: chronologically, empirically, and theoretically. This will be 
followed by a review of the literature on international administrations in order to highlight the 
main debates and issues in this international relations phenomenon. The literature review will 
show that, even though it is a much-discussed topic, there are still gray areas, including specifics 
on failing exit strategies and mandate prolongation. The conceptual framework will develop three 
perspectives: rationalism, constructivism, and regime complexity. A discussion of these will 
demonstrate why they are suitable and how each perspective can shed light on this deadlock. 
Finally, the methodology and data used to test these three hypotheses will be presented. A case 
study will allow for an in-depth analysis and comprehensive understanding of the interactions 
necessary to understand the issues from these three different angles. 
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Context 
In order to fully understand the deadlock in the Bosnia and Herzegovina international 
community, and the choice to focus on the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and 
European Union (EU) in this thesis, a brief presentation of each organization and its environment 
is necessary. Beginning with a discussion of the OHR, which is an ad hoc institution designed for 
the particular case of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, we will shed light on its history and 
operations. Then, we will turn to the EU and its efforts to help BiH on the path to EU 
membership in recent years. This section explains the reasons for focusing on these two 
institutions, given the broader international community invested in BiH. Finally, the deadlock 
will be discussed, both in Bosnia and more conceptually.   
Office of the High Representative: the Ad hoc Power 
 
The OHR was created in 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement under chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter. According to Knaus & Martin (2003), the OHR is at the heart 
of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since 1995, there have been seven 
High Representatives, all of whom have been Europeans,2 while the principal deputy position has 
always been assigned to an American. The mission of the OHR is comprised of seven tasks listed 
in Annex X of the Dayton Agreement:  
• Monitor the implementation of the peace settlement; 
• Maintain close contact with the parties to the Agreement, to promote their full compliance 
with all civilian aspects of the Agreement; 
                                                
2 Carl Bildt (1995-1997), Carlos Westendorp (1997-1999), Wolfgang Petritsch (1999-2002), Paddy Ashdown (2002-
2006), Christian Schwarz-Schilling (2006-2007), Miroslav Lajčák (2007-2009), and Valentin Inzko (2009-today). 
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• Co-ordinate the activities of the civilian organisations and agencies in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to ensure the efficient implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace 
settlement. The High Representative shall respect their autonomy within their spheres of 
operation while as necessary giving general guidance to them about the impact of their 
activities on the implementation of the peace settlement; 
• Facilitate, as the High Representative judges necessary, the resolution of any difficulties 
arising in connection with civilian implementation; 
• Participate in meetings of donor organisations; 
• Report periodically on progress to the United Nations, European Union, United States, 
Russian Federation, and other interested governments, parties, and organisations; and  
• Provide guidance to the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF). 
At first, the mandate of the OHR was limited to a year, until the 1996 elections. Tirak (2010) 
recounts:  
After the elections, which, instead of the change in the Bosnian political 
landscape that most of PIC members had hoped for brought the same 
political leaders who fought the war back into power, the OHR closure 
deadline was prolonged for a further two year ‘consolidation period’. 
After only a year—in December 1997—OHR’s mandate was extended 
indefinitely. It was during this PIC meeting that the High Representative 
was given the power henceforth to issue binding decisions (Tirak 2010, 
4).  
Through these powers (the so-called “Bonn powers”), the HR could remove presidents, prime 
ministers, judges, and mayors from office. There is no appeal system and no evidence is 
necessary to substantiate the HR’s decisions. He has the power to change, adopt, and veto 
legislation and also to create any new institutions he deems valuable. “In fact, the OHR is not 
accountable to any elected institution at all. It answers to a biennial gathering of foreign 
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ministries, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which it chairs” (Knaus and Martin 2003, 
61). Indeed, the OHR is often mistaken for an organ of the UN, but it is in fact a group of willing 
states that manages the OHR. The PIC is comprised of 55 countries and agencies, though it has 
not met since 2000. A subset of the PIC is the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board 
(PICSB), which comprises 11 members. These members are delegated to give political guidance 
to the OHR. But, as we will see later, there are divisions between them over the future of the 
international community, and more specifically the OHR, in Bosnia. Partly for this reason, they 
have faced difficulties in offering consolidated guidance to the High Representative and his staff.    
The vagueness of the task description and the extensive powers granted to the OHR have allowed 
successive HRs to adopt different modes of governance and entertain different relations with the 
Bosnian authorities (Peter 2013). Some have been more proactive, while other have refrained 
from using their powers. Valentin Inzko, the incumbent, has been the longest serving High 
Representative. For the most part, he has remained quite reserved about using the Bonn powers 
and testing the limits of his principals (i.e., the PICSB (Interview JT)). Shortly after his mandate 
began in 2009, the OHR was sidelined in the US/EU-led constitutional negotiations of Butmir. 
This is described in the following excerpt from Peter (2015):  
Inzko quite quickly experienced first-hand the increasing marginalization 
of the HR from international state-building processes. In October 2009 the 
EU and the US convened emergency constitutional talks in Butmir. […] 
He was ultimately invited to the meeting itself but his Office was not 
involved in its preparation. Although the process eventually failed, the 
visible exclusion of the HR was remarkable (Peter 2015, 144).  
Since 2008, the PICSB has referred to the so-called 5+2 agenda to define the necessary steps for 
closing the OHR. This plan includes five objectives (changes in property law and defense law, 
agreement on the status of Brčko district, achievement of fiscal sustainability, and the clear 
 9 
establishment of the rule of law) and two conditions: the signature of the Stability and 
Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU and a positive assessment from the PICSB regarding 
the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords (Board 2012). Year after year, the OHR annual 
reports complain—probably rightly—about the lack of cooperation from Bosnian elites to justify 
the partial implementation of the 5+2 agenda. 
Part of the problem is that, even if the Dayton Peace Agreement granted a coordinating role to the 
OHR, this body never had the resources or power to fulfill its role. As former High 
Representative Paddy Ashdown points out several times in his memoirs: “[t]he problem was that, 
although the ‘High Rep’ has a formal duty to coordinate all these bodies, he has no formal power 
to do so. In effect, they each have their own mandate, report directly to their own headquarters 
and need pay little heed to the OHR in what they do” (Ashdown 2007, 218). In 2002, Ashdown 
established the Board of Principals,3 a gathering of the heads of the international organizations 
working in BiH to foster coordination and avoid overlap between them. However, this entity has 
not released a common declaration since 2004.  
The OHR has been active in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the end of the war. Almost two 
decades later, this organization and its employees have developed a particular relationship with 
BiH. As Peter (2014) points out, “the OHR has become part of the domestic politics in BiH, not 
only acting as a corrective mechanism for breaches of the peace process but also developing the 
reform agenda for the country” (Peter 2015, 134).  
                                                
3 Participants include the Office of the High Representative, the European Union Force, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation Head Quarter Sarajevo, the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees, the European Union Police Mission, the European Commission, the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Development Program. 
 
 10 
 
European Union: a Growing Influence  
 
The other major actor from the international community in BiH, both in terms of size and 
financial and material implications, is the European Union. The intervention of the European 
Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been growing steadily since the end of the war. In 2000, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina became a potential candidate for EU integration. European officials 
have suggested, on numerous occasions, that Bosnia’s place is in the European Union. On the EU 
website, its three main aims regarding BiH are summed up in the following:  
• Presenting, explaining and implementing EU policy; 
• Analysing and reporting on the policies and developments in the country; and 
• Conducting negotiations in line with its mandate. 
To achieve these goals, the EU in BiH comprises two bodies: the Delegation and the Special 
Representative Office. The EUSR heads both of these, but they answer to different EU 
institutions. The Delegation operates under the leadership of the European Union Commission, 
while the EUSR mandate comes from the Council of the European Union. The EU delegation is 
principally responsible for the allocation of pre-accession funds and does most of its work from 
Sarajevo. The EUSR has offices in Banja Luka, Mostar, and Brčko and “offers advice and 
facilitation support in the political process to institutions at all levels, aimed at ensuring greater 
consistency and coherence of all political, economic and European priorities” (BiH 2015). The 
merging of the head of the Delegation with the EUSR was meant to give the EU a single voice to 
respond to Bosnian elites and the public. Despite some tensions between the two entities, in this 
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thesis, they will be treated as a single organization, since their work on the ground is mostly 
complementary. Together they constitute the European Union in BiH.  
 
In past few years, one of the biggest issues for the EU in BiH has been the Sejdić and Finci case. 
A judgement by the European Court of Human Rights declared that some provisions of the 
Bosnian Constitution violate the European Convention on Human Rights. According to the 
Bosnian Constitution, the Presidency must be a triumvirate, composed of one Croat, one Bosniak, 
and one Serb. This means that citizens of other ethnicities cannot run for President (Claridge 
2010). According to an observer of Bosnian politics, the EU has advocated with all its political 
influence and has still been unable to get Bosnian politicians to modify the Constitution. 
According to an OHR official:  
The EU gave its maximum push to apply the maximum amount of 
political pressure. There was nothing more from Brussels that they could 
do. They put out the maximum amount of what Brussels is capable of and 
it did not work. If they would have had more, they would have given 
more; but politically, the EU and the member states, is a very complex 
situation up there. They can deliver political pressure, but they had no 
more; they did not have extra in their pocket (Interview RP).  
 
The EU wanted to lead a project on its own and observers noted that it did not have enough 
political leverage to do so. According to Eralp (2009), the main tool of EU policy in Bosnia is the 
prospect of EU membership (Eralp 2009, 282), but there are doubts about its efficacy in the 
Balkans (Brljavac 2011, 9).  
 
In the last few years, the European Union has demonstrated a growing interest in the Balkans, 
including Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, according to Brljavac (2011), the EU is the main 
promoter of democracy in the Balkans “with overlapping processes of Europeanization and 
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democratisation. Although the Union developed new institutional relations with the regional 
countries through newly initiated SAA, it has faced a lot of challenges, especially in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” (Brljavac 2011, 10).  
 
To sum up, there are three main arguments that make the EU and OHR interesting institutions to 
study in the context of complexity and the deadlock situation in the international community in 
Bosnia. First, even if the OHR has downsized in the past few years to leave space for the EU to 
grow, it is still “the final authority in theatre” (Eralp 2009, 9). The definitive closure of the OHR 
does not seem likely in the foreseeable future. Until then, the EU and the OHR will have to 
continue to work together on Bosnian territory. Second, the OHR and EU constitute the core of 
the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They play leading roles in Bosnia’s 
international community, a distinction established by Brosig (2011) in his study of the 
international community in Kosovo (Brosig 2011, 197). This means that they are powerful and 
resourceful organizations, which can dominate the scene and act in various sectors. Thirdly, they 
are the institutions whose missions intersect the most. Similarly to Hofmann’s (2009) study of 
NATO and the European security and defence policy (ESDP), the main overlap in this case 
seems to be between only two institutions; the other institutions are more limited in their 
mandates. Indeed, the OHR and EU have far-reaching tasks to accomplish in BiH, while other 
organizations, like UNDP or the International Monetary Fund, work with more restricted 
functions.  
Deadlock: the International Community Impasse 
 
We now turn to the specifics of the deadlock, which developed in the international community in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially between the OHR and the EU. To describe this deadlock, a 
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brief historical overview of the international intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
fundamental. This overview divides the international intervention in three phases: stabilization, 
state-building, and transition.  
For the first four years after the war ended, from 1995 to 1999, stabilization was the primary 
concern. This phase was characterized by efforts to implement peace on the ground. At first, the 
NATO led military force (i.e., the IFOR and SFOR) ran the show. Following this, the OHR took 
a more active role and led projects to create the core elements of a Bosnian nation-state: a 
national flag and anthem, a common currency, a harmonization of license plates to support 
mobility on all Bosnian territory (Interview RP). Since the beginning of the international 
intervention, “the mandates of the international organisations frequently duplicated each other—
OSCE and OHR both had the responsibility for education, human rights and democratisation; 
both OHR and SFOR had a duty to oversee military reform” (Ashdown 2007, 224). From the 
outset, therefore, this overlap has contributed to the complexity of interactions between the 
international community in BiH.  
The second phase of the intervention, from 1999 to 2006, focused on reform and was marked by 
the tenure of Wolfgang Petritsch and Paddy Ashdown as High Representatives. This phase saw 
the establishment and implementation of aggressive reforms.  
Under HR Petritsch, the powers were primarily applied to create key 
state-level institutions (e.g. the State Border Service) and reform Bosnia’s 
creaking economy in the areas of taxation, privatization, and payment 
systems. Under HR Ashdown, the focus shifted from the creation of a 
legal framework towards application of that framework by domestic 
authorities, resulting in fewer impositions of laws but more removals of 
officials (Vogel 2006, 7).  
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During this period, there was an agreement on the division of labour between the Organisation of 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the OHR. The OSCE had concluded its electoral 
monitoring functions and had decided to focus on education, while the HR wanted to focus on 
institution-building, but according to an expert “the deal was personal […] It was between [High 
Representative] Ashdown and [OSCE head] Beecroft, so it was a sort of symbiosis where the 
OSCE got a new job and the High Rep said ‘if you need help, I will back you up with my 
authority’ and that worked for a while but then they both left” (Interview EM). This phase also 
saw the increasing involvement of the European Union, especially with the 2003 Thessaloniki 
Declaration, which officially affirmed EU membership prospects for all Balkan countries.  
The third and current phase, which began in 2006, is ongoing. It is characterized by a transition 
from Dayton to Brussels. This phase began with the announcement of the OHR closure planned 
for 2007, a closure that has been postponed a few times since. According to one OHR official: 
Basically, in one way or another, the focus has slowly been changing from 
Dayton led peace implementation to EU led meeting the requirements to 
join the EU […] That phase is set to continue for as long as anyone could 
predict. Because that phase has shown the slowest progress so far of all 
the phases, in terms of true results, true progress, it is also the longest 
phase by far […] Now we are already eight years into this transition phase 
and it is going to be even longer (Interview RP).  
In fact, the transition seems to have been stalled somewhere between the two institutions. 
Scholars use terms like ‘limbo’ (Peter 2013, 434) or ‘stuck’ (Vogel 2006, 3) to describe the 
situation. The employees working in both institutions also recognize that the transition is stalled. 
On the EU side, one informant admitted that the international community still needed the OHR to 
carry out its job: “there is still a role for the OHR in a number of areas where the EU can’t focus 
specifically. So the OHR still does have a role there” (Interview EM). On the OHR side, one 
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official stated, “until there is more consensus inside the PICSB, the current structure of the 
international community […] will stay more or less as it is now” (Interview RP). By these 
accounts, we can see that, in both institutions, employees notice the rigidity of the current 
arrangement of the international community and agree that they are in an impasse.  
I argue that this phase represents a deadlock, and that neither actor is capable of developing an 
exit strategy or a solution to conclude this transition period. While two other terms could also be 
used to describe the situation in BiH—namely ‘stalemate’ or ‘gridlock’—we contend that the 
term ‘deadlock’ is the most appropriate. Indeed, a short explanation of the meaning of these terms 
can clarify this. The word ‘stalemate’ comes from the game of chess and suggests adversarial 
parties. It was used during the Cold War to describe the situation of mutual deterrence between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. ‘Gridlock’ is more commonly used in domestic politics, 
and refers to a situation where institutions are able to legally block each other (e.g. Bahtić-
Kunrath 2011). The term ‘deadlock’, for its part, generally indicates negotiations; it is employed 
in international relations literature. Since the situation in Bosnia does not involve rival 
institutions and there are no signs of one trying to obstruct the other through legal means, 
deadlock seems to be the most appropriate term to describe the situation in BiH. Although there 
are no formal negotiations to speak of, the formation of an exit strategy by the international 
community in Bosnia involves the same processes and methods of concessions and bargaining 
required in negotiations.  
Narlikar’s (2010) book focuses on multilateral negotiations. She sets two conditions against each 
other in order to establish a deadlock situation corresponding to the one in Bosnia. First, “an 
extended situation of non-agreement exists, such that parties adopt inconsistent positions and are 
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unable or unwilling to make the concessions sufficient to achieve a breakthrough on the 
particular issues” (Narlikar 2010, 3). This condition accurately captures the impasse that besets 
international community politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Neither party is willing to make the 
necessary concessions or adjustments to resolve the situation. As we will see later, there is a 
profound divide among BiH international patrons. They hold irreconcilable views on Bosnia and 
on the future of the international community’s engagement. There does not seem to be any 
possibility of compromise; nor is there enough pressure coming from the administrations working 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina—the primary witnesses of the damage of this deadlock—to find a 
solution.  
Second, Narlikar (2010) emphasizes the importance of  
… a landmark moment in a negotiation process—which may be an 
‘action-forcing event’ in the shape of a chair’s text or a deadline imposed 
by a mediator, or may be a natural landmark endogenous to the 
negotiations and recognised as such by the parties involved—despite 
having set up expectations towards a compromise, is unable to trigger the 
necessary concessions to ensure an agreement on a particular issue 
(Narlikar 2010, 3).  
 
There have been few ‘action forcing events’ in the international community since 2006. For 
example, the announcement of the OHR closure can be characterized as such. In June 2006, the 
PICSB announced the closure of the OHR by June 30, 2007. As Tirak (2010) pointed out, in 
2006 the election results curbed the PICSB closure plan. Nationalist feelings resurfaced and the 
general political situation deteriorated. “So when the decision to close the OHR was revised in 
February 2007, the transition date was postponed to 30 June 2008. Finally, in its 2008 meeting, 
the PIC decided to extend the HR’s mandate indefinitely until a set of benchmarks had been 
fulfilled – the so-called “5+2” package” (Tirak 2010, 5). The failure to close the OHR was not 
the only event that stalled the transition. The EU’s mishandling of the Sejdić and Finci case also 
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contributed to the standstill, because for many observers, including some PICSB members, this 
proved that the EU was unable to ‘handle’ Bosnia. In 2007, the step-change policy adopted by the 
OHR under Miroslav Lajčák’s administration also had a stifling effect. In reaction to the 
mismanagement of police reforms, Lajčák tried to reassert the power of the OHR and force 
Bosnian politicians to cooperate. According to the International Crisis Group, “[t]he High 
Representative’s ‘step-change’ […] produced a seemingly impassable deadlock instead of 
opening the way to reform and Bosnia’s European future” (ICG 2009, 13).  
 
The foregoing has established the context for this thesis, both in what concerns the principal 
actors and the relations that link them in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, as we have seen, 
the impasse between these organizations has been a defining feature of international politics in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina for some time, and this remains a challenge for the transition from 
Dayton to Brussels. This thesis tests three possible frameworks that can explain the deadlock. But 
first, we review the international administrations literature relevant to this study. 
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Literature Review: International Administrations 
 
To place the thesis question and the situation in BiH in a larger context, we briefly survey the 
research literature on international administrations. International administrations have generated a 
lot of debate among scholars over their legality, functions, and aims. This section will 
demonstrate the relevance of this thesis by demonstrating that there have been no research studies 
focused on transitions—certainly not stalled transitions—within international administrations.  
 
International administrations are governance structures deployed within the larger framework of a 
peace-building mission (Brabandere 2009), where the administration of a territory is partly or 
wholly taken over by international partners. The cases of Kosovo, East Timor, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Afghanistan constitute some recent examples of such missions, 
which triggered both interest and criticism. International administrations emerge out of a rich 
historical tradition. The League of Nations administration, the United Nations Trusteeships 
system, and protectorates are all precedents that led to the development of present day 
international administrations. International administrations are also sometimes referred to as 
international transitional administrations (ITA). The commonality between these consists of a 
foreign or international entity that takes partial or total control over the governance of a territory. 
The next section describes the main characteristics of those interventions and debates over 
definitions.  
Definition 
 
To begin with, it is important to recognize that there is no universally agreed upon definition of 
an international administration. Notwithstanding, four elements are generally present in the 
definitions provided by scholars. First, there is a territory, which can be a state, part of a state, or 
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parts of multiple states. Usually (but not always) the territory is in a post-conflict period. Indeed, 
the term ‘war-torn’ is often used. As Jackson (2004) points out, “[t]he term raises the issue of 
international involvement and may even serve to justify it. The underlying assumption appears to 
be that international society has no interest or business in getting involved in peaceful territories” 
(Jackson 2004, 23).  
 
Second, there is a governing entity, which can emerge from an international consensus. It can 
encompass different international actors (e.g., states, international institutions) and different 
forms of engagements (e.g., supervision, governance, or assistance) (Stahn 2008, 44). For 
example, it can be managed directly by the United Nations, as was the case in Kosovo and East 
Timor. In the case of Bosnia, the United Nations delegated a group of willing countries (i.e., the 
Peace Implementation Council) to be responsible for the OHR. In other cases, such as Iraq, the 
involvement of the UN has been marginal. In that case, the mission was led primarily by the 
occupying powers, the United States and United Kingdom (Brabandere 2009, 45).  
 
The third element consists of the practice of these missions. Some authors have compared 
modern international administrations to trusteeships and protectorates (Berdal and Caplan 2004). 
The central question concerns the extent to which the new endeavour replicates a form of colonial 
domination of a previous colonial intervention. Some authors, like Ratner (2005), defend the idea 
that international administrations and occupations by other states are similar and that the former 
can learn from the latter. He points out that “both must conduct their occupations with a coherent 
approach to the relevant international and domestic law and be able to justify any coercive 
actions” (Ratner 2005, 719). Knaus and Martin (2003) suggest that occupations and international 
administration are analogous in terms of style and substance: “[v]ast ambitions, the fervent belief 
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in progress, the assumption that outsiders can best interpret the true interest of a subject people” 
(Knaus and Martin 2003, 62). Others, like Peter (2013), argue that the comparison with a 
protectorate is misleading, because, while they may be similar in the form, they are 
fundamentally different in intent. She writes: “Contemporary peace operations primarily work for 
the benefit of local population, while colonial exercises were conducted for the benefit of the 
metropole” (Peter 2014, 9).  
 
The fourth element, which is not included in every definition, is the transitional character of 
international administrations. Some have a fixed timeline, like in East Timor; others, like Kosovo 
and Bosnia, are expected to exit when their mission is complete, which leaves the timeline more 
open-ended (Peter 2013, 426). However, all international administrations are expected to transfer 
power over to local authorities at some point. We believe that a definition that takes these four 
elements into account would be the most complete, precise, and preferable. Stahn’s (2008) 
definition comes close. He defines international administrations as “the exercise of administering 
authority (executive, legislative or judicial authority) by an international entity for the benefit of a 
territory that is temporarily placed under international supervision or assistance for 
communitarian purpose” (Stahn 2008, 44-45).  
Debates  
 
In 2004, Mats Berdal and Richard Caplan held a symposium on the subject of international 
administrations in war-torn countries (Berdal and Caplan 2004). The contributions to that 
symposium focused on the political character of those missions, in contrast to the more technical 
and problem-solving literature that focuses on specific cases. They investigated three sets of 
questions about such interventions. First, what are their legal and normative justifications? 
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Second, what kind of changes should they aim for in the territories they administer? And third, 
how should their performances to evaluated? This literature review presents the debates on those 
three issues. We will see that they only allude to the question of exit strategies, without 
dedicating sufficient attention to the question of prolonged international administrations. 
 
The first group of studies are concerned with the legal or normative validity of such missions. 
One of the central questions has to do with reconciling the idea of establishing democracy and the 
rule of law through undemocratic means. Bosnia’ example can demonstrate the dictatorial 
character of international administrations:  
 The international mission to BiH has arrived at this paradoxical 
conclusion: What Bosnia and Herzegovina needs is not democratic 
domestic politics, but government by international experts. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, outsiders do more than participate in shaping the political 
agenda—something that has become the norm throughout Eastern Europe, 
as governments aspire to join the European Union. In BiH, outsiders 
actually set that agenda, impose it, and punish with sanctions those who 
refuse to implement it (Leroux-Martin 2013, 189) 
 
In the context of international law, the emphasis on the right to self-determination rather 
contradicts the legitimacy of international administrations. Yannis (2002), however, tries to 
reconcile the concept of state sovereignty with the presence of international administrations. He 
writes: “Political realities are decorated with legal forms without precise meaning since no 
criteria for declaring Cambodia’s sovereignty to be in abeyance are given other than an 
ambiguous post facto rationalization of the peace agreements” (Yannis 2002, 1044). If 
international administrations do not concur with democratic or legal principles, the question of 
how to establish the moral and legal authority of those administrations remains. 
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The ethical legitimacy of missions to war-torn countries usually rests on a limited set of options 
facing the international community in post-war environments. The majority of those missions 
were undertaken on an ad hoc basis to respond to exceptional circumstances in a post-conflict 
environment. The national or local authorities did not have the capacity to administer their own 
territory. Helman & Ratner (1992) underline the necessity of such interventions in failed states in 
order to ensure global stability. Wilde (2001), for his part, looks at the official reasons given for 
these missions, specifically how to respond to sovereignty and governance problems in those 
countries. Pattison (2013) discusses the justifiability of interventions in relation to the 
responsibility of rebuilding after a conflict or a state failure. Peter argues that the preceding 
arguments “mix liberal good intentions with realist concerns about the potential threat that these 
failed states’ pose to the West and the international system as a whole” (Peter 2014, 6). Dominik 
Zaum (2006), for his part, examines the authoritative sources of international administrations and 
tries to find ways to enhance their legitimacy. He identifies a contradiction in that consent for an 
international administration intervention is provided by the state, not by the population. In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, BiH and Serbia gave their assent to the international intervention by 
signing the Peace Treaty, not Bosnians. He concludes by suggesting that those administrations 
should focus on their effectiveness, increase their accountability, and develop the expert 
knowledge that makes their authority stand out. 
 
To respond to the issue of legal validity, Stahn’s (2008) contribution offers a detailed account of 
the legal basis for the establishment of international territorial administrations. He compares these 
to other historical kinds of international supervisions and discusses the current challenges and 
possibilities offered by these international interventions. According to Peter, however, these 
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accounts only depict part of the reality and do not convey the real life application of international 
administrations.  
They are portrayed as decisions taken by the abstract international 
community, a description that tells us very little of how these powers form 
and exhibit themselves in political practice. While the existence of powers 
is a condition for their use, it is how they translate into reality that is 
missing from this kind of typology; a question that should lie at the core 
of any study of international politics (Peter 2014, 4). 
 
The second body of literature focuses on the handling of international administrative operations. 
In this literature, there are also heated debates about the conduct of operations and their timeline. 
Some argue that operations should develop local ownership first (Chandler 2006a, Knaus and 
Martin 2003). These authors often raise doubts about the possibility of establishing a democratic 
state through undemocratic means (Cousens and Cater 2001). They argue for limited missions 
that would aim only to help local authorities assert their power. One alternative to international 
administration that they have suggested is the light footprint strategy. This was the approach 
adopted in Afghanistan (Chesterman 2004). It is a strategy that seeks to reinforce rather than to 
replace local authorities. Others authors advocate for a greater degree of intervention and 
recommend strong and rapid missions where the international community imposes the basic 
features of a democratic state. Certain think tanks, like the International Crisis Group, support 
this approach.  
Other studies rather focus on specific missions and identify the challenges and policy choices 
they face. Yannis (2004), for example, examines the political challenges posed by the UN 
mandate in Kosovo to the international administration and the factors that have influenced central 
policy choices on “how to govern” and “to what end”. Hohe (2002) examines the clash between 
existing local rules and imposed international standards. In a case study on East Timor, she 
observes two unrelated paradigms: the Western liberal-style democracy and indigenous local 
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political legitimation based on kinship and concludes that without reconciliation the international 
can be either irrelevant or destroy local systems without replacing them.  
 
The third set of studies evaluates international administration accomplishments either critically or 
in a problem-solving perspective. One of the difficulties is to set standards for the success of a 
mission. Call (2008) suggests that the success of peace-building missions should be judged 
according to two criteria: security (i.e., no recurrence of large-scale organized violence) and 
functioning state institutions to resolve potential social conflicts. Harland (2004) compares 
current UN international administrations to the post-war occupations of Germany, Japan, and 
Austria. He concludes that the UN might not be well suited for such operations (Harland 2004). 
Since international administrations are still rare and usually specific to the circumstances in 
which they are established, it is difficult to determine clear goals and criteria for success. Hence, 
in more open-ended missions such as in Bosnia, the intervention closure keeps being postponed, 
because objectives are not fulfill. This particular problem has been highlighted by numerous 
scholars (Peter 2013, Jackson 2004, Tirak 2010, Vogel 2006). However, it has never been the 
object of an in-depth analysis as this thesis proposes to achieve. The closure of international 
administrations is on one hand inevitable, because as we seen with the definition section those 
missions are supposed to be temporary. But on the other, it is extremely difficult to terminate 
them. The receiving countries are rarely on an irreversible path toward peace. Violence, ethnic 
feuds, economic decline are still possible realities. Moreover, and this is the topic of this thesis 
there must be a consensus among international overseers to end the intervention or to transform 
it.  
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Conceptual Framework: Testing Three Hypotheses  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to test rationalist, constructivist, and regime complexity propositions 
with the evidence collected during field research and to assess which actors and in which context 
each one best explains the international community’s inertia in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These 
perspectives seem particularly suitable as they propose compelling arguments explanations for 
the actors’ behaviours. As Finnemore & Sikkink (2001) point out, both constructivism and 
rationalism offer  
a framework for thinking about the nature of social life and social 
interaction, but makes no claims about their specific content. […] Neither 
constructivism nor rational choice provides substantive explanations or 
predictions of political behavior until coupled with a more specific 
understanding of who the relevant actors are, what they want, and what 
the content of social structures might be (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 
393).  
Regime complexity is different from the other two, but in this thesis it is used similarly. Regime 
complexity is a more recent trend of study in international relations and consists of accounting for 
complexity in explaining actors’ actions. Since, as we will see later, the international community 
in BiH can be considered as a complex regime, regime complexity arguments can explain the 
influence of this complexity on actors’ actions.  
Like Kratochvíl & Tulmets (2010), we conceptualise approaches as lenses to understand reality.  
Not only we can test the two approaches against each other, but we can 
also specify the ways in which different actors behave and analyse 
situations in which the behavioural modes change. […] some actors may 
rationally pursue their goals, and other actors may simply act upon the 
existing norms and rules without modifying them in order to make them 
more suitable for themselves (Kratochvíl and Tulmets 2010, 46).  
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In this thesis a similar dynamic is manifest. The hypothesis stands that the suitable perspective 
depends on the actors and the focus of analysis. This section will briefly present the major 
arguments for each perspective in reference to the situation of the international community in 
BiH and will also make a concise statement about what a refutation could look like.  
Rationalism 
 
Drawing heavily on microeconomics, rationalism is rooted in the conception of a rational and 
unitary actor (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, 7). One of the dominant strengths of this perspective is 
its parsimonious character. It selects a limited number of actors and a limited range of options to 
explain actions. As Olsen & March (1998) point out, this perspective presupposes that actions 
can be explained by their expected outcomes (March and Olsen 1998, 950). The rationalist 
perception, therefore, looks at actors’ alternatives and their associated benefits to explain their 
choices. Game theory is an important model in rationalism “incorporating features […] that 
appear to be relevant” (Osborne 2004, 3) in a basic but representative table in order to improve 
the understanding of a situation.  
Game theory is central here because it explains the sub-optimal equilibrium that is deadlock. 
According to Clemens (2004), in game theory a deadlock occurs when both parties defect 
simultaneously. The deadlock will continue as long as there are no strong incentives to break it 
off (Clemens 2004, 211). Moreover, game theory tells us that deadlocks are Pareto-optimal 
equilibria meaning “it is impossible to improve one player’s payoff without reducing another’s” 
(Tsebelis 1990, 65). This appears to be the case of the international community in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where there seems to be no solution that could simultaneously keep the security net 
offered by the OHR and his Bonn powers and starts serious negotiations on EU integration, 
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which would require a fully independent country without international administrators. 
Nonetheless, we must recognize that there are also strong incentives to resolve the deadlock in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU is increasingly invested in the region, while the United States 
and other PICSB members tend to have more pressing concerns in other parts of the world.  
Constructivism 
 
Constructivism is based on the co-construction of agents and structures (Shannon and Kowert 
2012, 12). March & Olsen (1998) use the term “logic of appropriateness” to characterize 
constructivism (March and Olsen 1998). This framework considers identities and norms as 
determinants for explaining actors’ behaviours. “Action involves evoking an identity or role and 
matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation” (March and Olsen 1998, 
951). According to Barnett & Finnemore (2004), IOs mirror the numerous and complex 
contradictions of the international realm “which, in turn, can lead to contradictory and ultimately 
dysfunctional behaviour” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 38). To understand the dysfunctional 
behaviour that is deadlock through a constructivist perspective two features are essential: 
identities of the international community and the norms they follow.  
From a constructivist perspective, the deadlock within the international community has been 
partly caused by a significant disagreement over its self-perception. While some of the 
internationals see their role as protectors of the Dayton agreement, and of the Bosnian population 
more generally, others consider that they are partners of BiH. The lack of consensus over the 
international community’s identity in Bosnia perpetuates the deadlock, since these two identities 
operate in parallel instead of transferring the role and leadership from the OHR to the EU. Norms 
also help drive the deadlock. This view concurs with some of the interviewees’ perceptions that 
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in the past decade the international community has been on autopilot. As Alexander Wendt has 
suggested, norms are not just created by interactions, but are also sustained by them, as a self-
fulfilling prophecy. “Bureaucracies can become obsessed with their own rules at the expense of 
their primary missions in ways that produce inefficient and self-defeating outcomes” (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004, 3).  
Arguably, basic norms and identities are shared and the differences could be easily resolved. 
Despite some differences, as they have the same goal for BiH, they could escape this auto-pilot 
and start to work cooperatively on a political basis, rather than only on the operational level.  If 
constructivism suggests that norms and identity can allow inefficiencies to persist, it also 
maintains that change is possible and that identities and norms can transform and produce 
different outcomes.  
Regime Complexity 
 
Regime complexity affirms that when complexity is present it affects the actors’ behaviour. 
Complexity can have multiple influences. As Alter and Meunier (2009) point out “where there is 
significant political disagreement, we are both more likely to find international regime 
complexity and to find that this complexity is causally important” (Alter and Meunier 2009, 21). 
Some authors found that regime complexity increased cooperation, while in other settings it 
reduces it. 
In the case of Bosnia, the each regime brings its own institutional norms and expectations, which 
add to the confusion. In turn, each organization returns to its own culture, which makes 
cooperation even harder. In fact, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, regime complexity has contributed 
to a detrimental degree of competition among actors, which has allowed the deadlock to continue. 
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The overlaps in terms of mandates, assets, and memberships between the OHR and the EU allows 
actors to avoid undesirable outcomes by blocking the other, and consequently blocking the 
situation as a whole.  
The challenge with regime complexity argumentation is that of identifying a causal relationship. 
It is difficult to know where and how causality works in a complex system. Therefore, while 
complexity might be a contributing factor, it is almost impossible to prove that it is the main 
cause of the deadlock. The literature started to identify some of the possible implications of 
complexity. Stephanie Hofmann’s work on NATO and ESDP helps apprehend the relationship 
between overlapping institutions that are neither fully competitive nor completely cooperative.  
In summary, this thesis explores three explanations of deadlock based on the case study provided 
by the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These are all suitable for the study of 
deadlock in Bosnia and Herzegovina. First, constructivism and rationalism being not substantive 
theories, they can be adaptable to a large range of issues, actors, and situations. Second, the 
international community in Bosnia exhibits features of a complex regime, which makes regime 
complexity an interesting perspective through which to comprehend the actions of the actors 
muddling through this complexity. The next section looks at the methodology and data used to 
conduct it.  
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Methodology 
 
Considering the objective of this thesis, which is to understand why there is a deadlock, the most 
suitable approach seems to be the case study, as it illuminates decisions and the reasons they were 
taken (Schramm 1971). This section will briefly review the characteristics and structure of this 
case study, its potential, and it will describe and justify the data collection and its use.  
 
Creswell (2013) has identified the defining features of case studies (Creswell 2013, 98-99). First, 
he suggests, a case study must present a comprehensive understanding of the subject at hand. 
This study offers an in-depth understanding of the international intervention in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by triangulating data from interviews and written documents from scholars and 
officials. Second, a case study must be limited to a bounded system (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 
444). The study of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the context of this 
thesis, can be considered as a bounded system because it is limited in both time and scope. This 
thesis focuses on the international community since 2006, the year when the current stalled 
transition began. Additionally, this study is limited to the most influential international 
community actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely the EU and the OHR. Third, a case study 
should be either intrinsic or instrumental. This case study is instrumental, because the objective is 
to help illuminate and further the understanding of international administrations and the 
difficulties linked to their exit strategies. Finally, the descriptive part is important, even if this 
thesis has obvious explanatory objectives; it still relies heavily on a meticulous description of the 
deadlock in the international community of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
This thesis adopts a comparative framework. It “repeats the same case study two or more times, 
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comparing alternative descriptions or explanations of the same case” (Yin 2003, 153). Indeed, the 
same body of evidence was tested against three frameworks in order to assess and compare their 
conclusiveness. Similarly, but with much more modest aims to Allison’s Essence of Decision 
(1971), where each demonstration carries a different explanation of the Cuban missile crisis 
(Allison 1971, 8). In this case, rationalism, constructivism, and regime complexity examine the 
same central problem (i.e., the international community deadlock) and develop arguments able to 
explain it.  
 
The data used in this thesis come form two main sources: interviews and primary and secondary 
written sources. First, interviews are central to my enquiry, as they allow me to obtain detailed 
information as to why actors act the way they do. Instead of directly asking my informants to 
explain their reasons for their actions and consequently presenting them upfront my 
understanding of the international community in Bosnia and their (in)activity, I took another 
approach. I asked them to explain their own vision of the situation, their perception of the role 
they hold, and their expectations. The interviews were divided in three sections. In the first, we 
asked the interviewees about the timeline of the implication of the international community and 
how they perceive the role of the OHR and EU in Bosnia. The second part focused on the 
transition, asking the interviewees about relations right now in the international community with 
examples of cooperation and competition. The final part was about the future of BiH and of the 
international community.  
 
In the summer of 2014, I had the opportunity to partake in an internship at the Post-conflict 
Research Center (P-CRC) based in Sarajevo. Velma Šarić and Leslie Woodward founded and 
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manage this center, whose mission is to foster reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in 
the Balkans through new media. My field research was often intertwined with my internship, 
since P-CRC has a lot of contacts in all the international organizations working in Sarajevo, 
including the EU delegation and the Office of the High Representative. 
 I conducted the interviews between July and August of 2015, either in Sarajevo in the 
interviewees’ offices, or in coffee shops, or via Skype to reach experts who were not currently in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. I interviewed two sets of actors: employees and officials working for 
the OHR or the EU in Bosnia, and experts and scholars with particular knowledge and take on 
Bosnian politics. To access a larger pool of possible informants, I guaranteed their 
confidentiality4 and let them choose whether or not they wanted the interview to be recorded. The 
interviewees were selected through snowball sampling, using my first interviewees to gain access 
to other respondents (Leech 2002, 671). At the end of each interview, I would ask them if they 
had people in mind to help me continue my research. This way I obtained names, email 
addresses, and even telephone numbers. The international community in Sarajevo is quite small 
and it is easier to obtain an interview if someone refers you. When I interviewed officials, I 
started by contacting the liaison department of each institution to have my first contact. They 
often gave me access to their counter-parts in other organizations, so I could have access to the 
other side of the story. For expert interviewees, I had help from my internship supervisor who has 
contacts in think tank and universities in BiH and in the Balkans more generally.  They gave me 
access to their contact list.  
To triangulate the interviews, I also used a number of primary and secondary sources (e.g., press 
                                                
4 The initials identifying each interviewee are used coherently but have been changed to ensure greater anonymity.  
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releases, organizational charts, factsheets, biographies, and scientific papers). These data can be 
categorized in two sets. First, there are the official documents, which include press releases, plans 
of action, and progress reports of both the European Union and the Office of the High 
Representative.  
 
As Ferretti (1984) points out, bureaucratic activities are essentially based on producing paper:  
Ces documents sont […] précieux et ce à plus d'un titre. Tout d'abord, 
dans la mesure où ils sont relativement précis, ces documents permettent 
d'avoir une connaissance directe et réelle de l'action menée par 
l'organisation tout entière. Mais, qui plus est, ces documents permettent de 
se faire une idée du cheminement et des différents stades de l'action 
menée (Ferretti 1984, 168). 
 
These documents help one to understand official explanations for the behaviour of these 
organizations. They reveal the way they want to present themselves to the public and to their 
partners.  
 
The second set of documents examined in this study are those produced by experts and former 
officials; these include biographies, scientific articles, and assessments. These data are useful 
because they often give more direct evidence of events. The authors of these papers usually retain 
an intricate knowledge of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its politics; they lived there for decades 
and developed a precise outlook on the work of the international community. One of the great 
examples of this category is Paddy Ashdown’s autobiography (Ashdown 2007) in which he 
reflects on his time as HR with a beneficial distance.  
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In conclusion, this chapter presented the main actors of the international community in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (i.e., the OHR and the EU) as well as the transition between them. It is 
important to present those actors’ relation to Bosnia in a short historical perspective, because it 
helps to see how and why the current transition is so important as well as why it being in a 
deadlock can be of interest.  
This chapter also discussed the main topic of this thesis, which is international administration. 
Presenting a literature review focusing on the definition and debates on this issue. Being a rare 
phenomenon in International Relations, but with various historical precedents, it is somewhat 
difficult to find a consensual definition. Moreover, the validity, operationalization and fulfilment 
of those international interventions are all issues for scholarly debates.  
Rationalism, constructivism and regime complexity were selected for their suitability and 
relevance to this case. Rationalism and constructivism versatility helps them to explain a large 
variety of situations involving different actors including the one at hand, while regime 
complexity concurs to the characteristics of Bosnia and Herzegovina international community 
and offers a global understanding of the relations among actors. The conceptual framework 
briefly presented each one in relation to Bosnian deadlock.  
Case study appeared to be the most suitable method to approach this research topic. Since, it 
includes a comprehensive understanding of the case and therefore allowed to study it through 
different perspectives. Interviews with experts and officials proved to be extremely helpful when 
coupled with documents that supplemented my understanding of the situation.  
In summary, this thesis offers a contribution to the literature on international administrations. 
Despite the fact that case studies often reduce the potential of generalizations, it may be possible 
to repeat this research design for other cases of deadlock in international administrations and 
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detect similar patterns if they exist. It would also be relevant to reproduce this methodology for 
cases where the international community has taken a different approach, such as the light 
footprint strategy.  
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Chapter Two: Explanations for the Deadlock 
 
This chapter is the core of the thesis. We will test the three explanatory frameworks—namely 
rationalism, constructivism, and regime complexity—against the evidence gathered throughout 
this study in Bosnia. Without offering a definitive answer as to which framework has the greatest 
explanatory power, this thesis demonstrates that depending on the actors we examine, or the 
focus we prefer, one explanation may be more suitable than others.  
 
This thesis tries to test each hypothesis to its fullest extent and be fair to their arguments. 
However, for every research enterprise, some choices had to be made. The guidance for those 
choices emerged from what the literature had to offer regarding deadlock in general and 
extrapolating it to apply it to the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
Rationalism 
 
The first hypothesis explored in this thesis is rationalism. The rationalist perspective holds that 
individuals make rational decisions in accordance with the information available to them. A cost-
benefit calculation is therefore at the core of each decision. March & Olsen (1998) refer to this 
framework as the ‘logic of consequences’, because the expected outcomes or consequences are 
the major factor determining the worth of one option over another. This section will suggest a 
possible rationalist explanation for the international community deadlock in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. To do so, we focus on the PICSB, the EU members, and the EU institutions and we 
endeavour to demonstrate how game theory can shed light on the decision-making processes that 
contributed to the deadlock. 
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We will see that, although the rationalist perspective has some merits in portraying the 
negotiations between the two opposing factions of the principals, it fails to explain the somewhat 
counterintuitive nature of the deadlock. Indeed, despite some benefits, the prolonged deadlock 
still makes the actors of international community in BiH look bad and there are also strong 
incentives that could lead them to be more proactive and to find a solution to the impasse.  
 
The states and institutions participating in the international community in BiH form a 
heterogeneous group, where each one tries to defend its own interests and preferences. In fact, the 
principals are deeply divided on the future of the international intervention in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. There are two broad groups: the first one advocates for a stronger EU presence and 
the closure of the OHR; the second one wishes to empower or at least keep the OHR until the risk 
of conflict totally disappears in Bosnia. In line with the rationalist perspective, the discussions 
and disagreements between them can be construed as a negotiation, which involves joint decision 
making in a climate of uncertainty and conflict by multiple parties holding divergent positions in 
order to find a common ground (Rubin and Zartman 2000, 12). We contend that rationalism 
would argue that the irreconcilable preferences of these actors and the ensuing absence of 
consensus have allowed the deadlock to persist.  
 
Deadlock explained through Game Theory 
 
First, we need to explain in greater detail what rationalism has to say about deadlocks. In 
rationalism, actors make choices in accordance with their evaluation of the value intrinsic to each 
option available to them. If a deadlock persists, it is because parties’ interests are not reconcilable 
with a compromise. In the language of game theory, deadlock happens when the preferred course 
of action is defection for both players. The divergent goals make it impossible to find a middle 
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ground. Therefore, if there is a gain for one player, it is necessarily made at the expense of the 
other.  
 
Graphically, this situation can be illustrated by Figure 1. The value granted for a double defection 
is two for each participant; the benefits in terms of prestige and power for protecting a strong 
position outweigh the downsides of not reaching an 
agreement, hence the perpetuation of the deadlock. If they 
both cooperate they only obtain one, because their 
preferences are so different, mutual cooperation means that 
both took actions that are contrary or at least far from their initial interests. When the advantages 
of defecting outweigh the advantages of cooperating, the deadlock persists, since none of the 
players are benefiting from cooperation more than from defection. Binmore (1994) insists on the 
fact that deadlock happens when two players stay at the table but without ever reaching an 
agreement (Binmore 1994, 66). Currently, the OHR and EU have no choice but to stay at the 
table, as their mandates and goals are so intertwined. Thus, it is difficult to conceive an exit to the 
deadlock that would not involve both institutions.  
 
Osborne (2004) states that there are three components to a complete description of game theory: a 
set of players, a set of actions for each player, and, for each player, preferences over their set of 
action profiles. The following will discuss each component in relation to the case at hand: the 
BiH international community.  
 
 
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 1,1 0,3 
Defect 3,0 2,2 
Figure 1 
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Players 
 
In our case study, PICSB and EU members are the players and are divided in two camps, one 
supporting more a EU-centered approach and the other endorsing the OHR policy. Each camp 
has adherents in both institutions. In fact, there is no consensus among the EU member-states 
over the future of the international intervention (Tirak 2010, 9). This situation exists to a greater 
extent in the PICSB, with the addition of actors like the United States, Turkey, and Russia, which 
hold even more distant views. According to an OHR official, “the level of consensus inside the 
PICSB is absolute at the lowest on what to do next […] so I suspect that until there is more 
consensus inside the PICSB, the current structure of the international community in the next one 
or two years […] will stay as it is more or less” (Interview RP). In the European Union also the 
lack of consensus has a role in the deadlock. As Brljavac (2011) points out, “the EU is equally 
responsible for the current status quo since its member states are not united in terms of proposed 
standards and measures expected from Bosnian government” (Brljavac 2011, 15). Currently, the 
dissentions within the international community have maintained the situation more or less as it 
was in 2006. 
 
These principals have contacts through their foreign ministers, head of states, and ambassadors in 
international capitals as well as in Bosnia. They assess their interests by evaluating the situation 
in BiH but also by placing it in relation to the larger international context (Interview WQ). The 
problem of more pressing issues on the international stage has always been a challenge for 
progress in BiH. Former High Representative Paddy Ashdown refers to this in his memoirs: 
Once again, I was learning that any international cooperation can become 
prey to anything that happens on the wider international scene. Before I 
started my mandate I had been told that managing Bosnia was like 
herding cats. What I hadn't appreciated was that this applied to the 
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international community, too. In fact, during my mandate I spent more 
time overall managing the international community than I did trying to 
manage the situation in Bosnia, a tendency which appears to apply to all 
those whose job it is to lead international operations of this sort (Ashdown 
2007, 242). 
Actions 
 
The set of actions available to these players is quite large and depends on their creativity, but we 
can describe four main and encompassing possibilities. First, they can both defect. If they stay at 
the table to discuss but without coming to any agreement and things stay as they have been for 
almost a decade, this perpetuates the deadlock situation (right down corner of Figure 2). Second, 
the EU could take over. In this scenario, the OHR would be closed and Bosnia would continue 
and strengthen its path toward 
integration; it would be a compromise 
from the pro-OHR group and a win for 
the pro-EU group (bottom-left corner).  
Third, the High Representative could be 
empowered. He could then use his power to solve the lingering issues in Bosnia, like the 
Constitution and Republika Sprska irredentism. This represents those with the will to “get the 
most out of the OHR” (ICG 2009). In this case, the EU would make the compromise (upper-right 
corner). The fourth option is rather difficult to conceptualize. Either both institutions would be 
empowered, with the possibility of greater friction between them about mandates, management, 
and coordination, or both would downsize and Bosnia would no longer have international 
overseers. In this scenario, none of the groups would have what they want. This is the cooperate-
cooperate option (upper-left corner). 
 
 
 
Pro-EU 
group 
Pro-OHR group 
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 1,1 0,3 
Defect 3,0 2,2 
Figure 2 
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Preferences 
 
We can now turn to the preferences of players for each course of action. The preferences, or 
expected outcomes, are the crux of the problem here. We have roughly two camps holding 
opposing views on the possibility of closing the OHR. The present discussion will be devoted to a 
presentation of these camps’ positions and failed attempts to resolve their differences to conclude 
that the deadlock has been the logical outcome.  
 
First, even though the European Union and the Peace Implementation Council share the same 
goal for BiH, namely Bosnia’s accession to the EU, they are divided: some want to close the 
OHR as soon as possible and others believe that the OHR is still necessary in BiH. These groups 
assess the situation in BiH differently and hold divergent interests, which leads them to clashing 
conclusions and an ongoing failure to find a common solution. Essentially, the two groups have 
opposite estimations of the OHR’s costs and benefits and none of the actors are able to make 
concessions to reach an agreement.  
 
This divide crystallized after EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
Catherine Ashton’s visit to the Republika Sprska capital, Banja Luka, in 2011. One expert recalls: 
“it was particularly poisonous with the Americans against the EU. I was in Washington the day 
that happened and I never hear so many ‘fucking European’ in the state department than that day” 
(Interview JT). This crisis started with Republika Sprska wanting to challenge the state-level 
competencies. While the High Representative wanted to intervene and use his Bonn powers, as 
he had done in 2009 under similar circumstances, the EU called for a negotiated solution. 
Catherine Ashton sidelined the HR, Valentin Inzko, and discussed directly with Republika Sprska 
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Prime Minister Milorad Dodik. “In response the High Representative submitted a special report 
to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), arguing that BiH faced the worse crisis since 
Dayton. […] Such resolute action by the HR was an attempt to send a message that enforcement 
powers were still needed” (Peter 2015, 145). This brief account outlines the basic structure of the 
conflict between the two camps: one wants an empowered OHR to guarantee security and 
stability in BiH and the other, the EU, wishes to assume “the role of primary negotiator with local 
parties” (Peter 2015, 145).  
 
Even EU and OHR officials recognize this disagreement. As one EU official admitted: 
Of course within a club of 28 states you will get differences of opinion. 
You will get differences of opinions on let’s say the mandate of EUFOR, 
or the mandate of OHR, or the mandate of the EUSR. You will get some 
member-states who politically are more right wing and want more action 
in terms of say introducing sanctions or legal penalties or finances 
penalties, of course they all exist (Interview EM).  
 
We now describe in detail the positions of each group.  
 
 Pro-EU Group 
The first group could be labelled the “enlargement uber alles” camp (interview JT). To begin, it 
is important to keep in mind that, despite the name of the group, it does not include all of the EU 
member-states. As Tirak has pointed out, countries such as United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Denmark5 tend to side with the pro-OHR group. In fact, those labels are used to describe the 
inclination rather than the membership of each group.  
 
                                                
5 Denmark is not a member of the PICSB but still supports OHR maintenance.  
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This pro-EU group sees Bosnia and Herzegovina as a partner, as asserted by the former High 
Representative, Miroslav Lajčák, in an interview (Loza 2009). They want to encourage and 
empower the local elites so that Bosnia can meet the conditions to enter the EU. The pro-EU 
group thinks that the executive powers, or Bonn powers, held by the OHR are not necessary, and 
even humiliating “because it portrays [the international community] as ineffectual” (Interview 
JT). They express their concern about the often-mentioned impossibility of establishing 
democracy through undemocratic means (Ashdown 2007, 242). Therefore, they wish to close the 
OHR as soon as possible. Some of them are even willing to lower the 5+2 conditions for the 
closure of the OHR (Tirak 2010, 10, ICG 2009, 16). One expert informant confessed: “it seems to 
me that the EU and many countries in the EU, but not all, are mostly interested in how to close 
down the OHR and not how to help it to do its job” (Interview WQ).  
 
This camp includes the main continental European states, namely Germany, France, Italy, Spain 
as well as the EU institutions (the commission and the EEAS) and also Russia. An informant 
from the OHR observed, “France, Germany, and Italy their position have been changing but 
basically, […] they want OHR to go away immediately, because they believe that the EU can 
handle it” (Interview RP). Russia might look like an odd member in this group, but as one 
informant explained: “[Russians] support this but not because they were big cheerleaders for the 
EU enlargement but they were for a divided and ineffectual West and they are still for that even 
more so now” (Interview JT).  
 
They see the EU integration as a means to increase security and stability in the region and in 
Bosnia in particular. On the regional front, according to one EU official, “Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina is in the soft underbelly of Europe, from a public security point of view; it is in the 
major drugs, human trafficking, and fire arms trafficking routes into Europe. It was to find a way 
of functioning. It presents a threat to the peace and stability of Europe” (Interview EM). Hence, 
this group considers that, by extending EU frontiers to include BiH, the European Union would 
be better able to control and curb illicit trade. On the national front, they hold that “European 
integration will eventually overcome group divisions and serve to stabilise the country” 
(Sebastian 2009a, 2). Bosnia is a divided country with two entities, one district, and ten cantons, 
divided along ethnic lines. The hope is that the European Union’s influence will erode the 
importance of these entity and cantonal frontiers and transform Bosnia into a more united country.  
 
Moreover, a successful transition would reaffirm the role and importance of the European Union 
on the world stage. If the whole Balkan region, including BiH, was to be within Europe it would 
be another accomplishment for the EU integration process, one even more impressive than the 
integration of the Eastern European countries, considering the recent history of the Balkans. For 
this group, the reputational cost of maintaining the OHR outweighs the potential political and 
military cost of having to re-intervene in BiH without the Bonn powers in the event of a return to 
violence. Moreover, they judge as unlikely the reoccurrence of widespread violence in Bosnia.  
 
we also have to look at the counter-arguments, which would point to a resolution of the deadlock. 
To do so we have to underline the powerful incentives that could encourage the participating 
countries and institutions to act more proactively. In the last few years, European Union 
institutions have increased their interest and involvement in Bosnia, both in terms of money and 
manpower. According to an EU official working in BiH,  
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When you look to Ukraine, it is obviously extremely urgent, pressing 
issue. But we have seen no change in focus from Brussels as for BiH. Yes, 
of course, they have increased their focus on Ukraine, but they haven’t 
altered their focus here in Bosnia. I say that from my own perspective. 
From what I can read and see from Brussels there is no difference. Our 
mandate remains the same, we haven’t lost staff, and we haven’t lost 
finances. So I don’t see it as that big an issue (Interview EM).  
 
The maintenance of EU institutions’ interest could be a trigger for change in the international 
community in BiH; however, we have not seen that happening. In fact, though they are still 
interested in BiH, they have not taken the actions to resolve the deadlock and push for their 
positions either in the PICSB meetings or in the EU decisional instances.    
  
 
Pro-OHR Group 
This group includes Canada, Turkey, the United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands and Japan. 
Here again, the label does not infer membership, “[a]lthough the EU makes up more than half of 
the PIC Steering Board, there is no common EU voice in the PIC” (Tirak 2010, 9). Contrary to 
the previous group, they are sceptical about the success of the enlargement process and fear the 
return of violence in BiH. We will analyse these views in turn.  
 
First, they often doubt the EU’s state building capacities (Peter 2013, 434). For example, the 
United States and Turkey are “concerned that EU conditionality and membership negotiations, 
which are conceived as a technical process, cannot adequately address these deeply political 
issues as they arise” (Peter 2015, 138). This group holds to the OHR, which they believe to be 
more efficient and to have a more of a hands-on approach than the EU.  
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Second, this group is concerned about stability and safety issues, and is supported by policy 
advisors, like Woehrel, who argues, “[a]voiding widespread violence or even the breakup of 
Bosnia would presumably be the most basic international objective” (Woehrel 2013, 11). For this 
reason, they value the safety net offered by the OHR and its Bonn powers. If the OHR was to be 
dismantled, they believe, it would be difficult to achieve another consensus at the United Nations 
Security Council if ethnic feuds in Bosnia were rekindled. The Dayton peace agreement has 
produced similar results to those observed by Brosig (2011) concerning the international 
administration in Kosovo: “once deployed, missions to Kosovo persist. Mission deployments 
appear as sticky because the political threshold to change the actor configuration is high, it would 
require the passing of a new Security Council Resolution for which there is no consensus at sight” 
(Brosig 2011, 191). Thus, this group of principals, present in both the OHR and the EU, 
advocates for the maintenance of the OHR; for them, the risk of conflict in BiH, even 20 years 
after the end of the war, remains. To this group opinion, the potential consequences of a conflict 
in BiH without the supervision of the OHR are significant and thus they acquiesce to keep the 
Office of the High Representative active even if it is not the ideal solution. As stated by an OHR 
official:  
United States is reluctant to let OHR go, because it views OHR as an 
insurance policy in case, the worst case scenario comes you at least have 
legal authority that is valid, still valid under UN security council 
resolution. It would be [impossible] find a new UN Security Council 
resolution on BiH, because of Russia, never. So you can understand it 
from a strategic point of view, you would not give away the tactic legal 
power knowing that in the worst case scenario it would probably develop 
high level of consensus on preventing the complete collapse and that is 
why the US holds, not that they love OHR, no, but they don’t want to give 
away the international community legal authority as based on 
international law under chapter VII (Interview RP). 
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For the time being, this group has achieved its objective of keeping the OHR, despite the fact that 
he is disempowered. As Tirak (2010) points out: 
The majority of the EU member states feel hostage to the PIC 5+2 
conditionality, which isn’t producing results. In order to break the 
stalemate, some EU countries, particularly Italy and France, pushed the 
idea of ‘watering down’ the 5+2 conditionality. On the other hand, the UK 
and to a lesser extent the Netherlands and Denmark, did not want to agree 
on it. For the latter, the issue was a matter of credibility – not to loosen the 
conditionality, as that would send the wrong message of the EU backing 
off when faced with enduring resistance to fulfilling its conditions. Since 
this position was shared by the US and Turkey, the conclusion was 
obvious: the 5+2 conditions must be fulfilled – full stop (Tirak 2010, 8-9).  
 
Credibility issues are really important to this group and remaining strict with Bosnian elites about 
the OHR exit requirements is seen as a means to keep credibility (Woehrel 2013, 7). 
 
Unlike the pro-EU group, its relative disinterest could trigger change and resolve the deadlock. 
According to many observers, the OHR is becoming more and more irrelevant (Eralp 2012, 49, 
ICG 2009, 15). Moreover, the institution has not benefitted from the support of the international 
community in the last few years (Woehrel 2013). The disinterest, coupled with declining support, 
may induce the end of the OHR’s mission. As the OHR falls into disuse, even its strongest 
supporters may be convinced of its uselessness. A fortiori, if the EU grows, it may prove that it is 
able to manage both Bosnia and the international community in Bosnia more effectively than the 
OHR. The disinterest of non EU-members for Bosnia and Herzegovina is increasingly clear, as 
corroborated by the move of the Canadian Embassy from Sarajevo to Budapest, Hungary. Hence, 
they might be willing to let the EU take the lead someday. 
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Conclusion 
 
A conclusion that can be drawn from this section is that rationalism can only partially explain the 
actions, or inaction, of international players. Game theory helps to illustrate the negotiations 
taking place between the pro-EU and pro-OHR groups. However, what may appear as an 
equilibrium of both players constantly defecting is actually, according to two expert informants, 
harmful or even dangerous (Interview WQ and JT).  
 
If we can rationally understand how the assessments made by PIC and EU member-states have 
led to a stalemate, we also have to recognize that they also hold strong incentives to get things 
done in BiH. For the EU, the boost in their reputation, which could come from achieving a 
successful and peaceful transition from Dayton to Brussels and the marginal risks involved in 
closing the OHR, is not trivial. Moreover, non-EU countries exhibiting less and less interest in 
the Balkans, compared to other regions of the world, is a cause for concern; hence they could 
leave Bosnia in the hands of the EU. Thus if inertia might seem attractive in some respects, there 
are also increasing pressures as time passes for the principals to act and to resolve the 
international situation in BiH. For these reasons, the rationalist perspective may not be the best 
suited to explain the deadlock; mostly the question remains as to why the deadlock persists in 
BiH.  
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Constructivism 
 
Constructivism is based on the notion that ideas are the basis of the social world. Ideas have a 
transformative but also a perpetuating role in the conceptualization of the world (Fearon and 
Wendt 2002, 57). This section will demonstrate how constructivism justifies the international 
community deadlock in BiH differently than rationalism. March & Olsen (1998) refer to the logic 
of appropriateness and state that “[t]he pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more than 
with interests, and with the selection of rules more than with individual rational expectations” 
(March and Olsen 1998, 951). Accordingly, the international community deadlock will be 
analyzed with the tools of constructivist analysis: mutually created identities, implicit and explicit 
rules and norms influencing actors’ actions. The basic idea is that actors are caught up in 
identities, rules, and discourses that limit and restrict their behaviours to known courses of action, 
thereby prolonging the deadlock.  
 
The focus in this section will be on the organizations and their bureaucracies. The identities and 
norms developed by those are particularly relevant to the constructivist perspective. As we will 
see, the development of specific organizational identities and norms affects outcomes. On one 
hand, since the EU and OHR mentalities and relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina are largely 
incompatible, they tend to work in parallel instead of cooperatively. While we see illustrations of 
cooperation at the operational level, the incorporation of the two entities seems unmanageable, as 
proven by the failed coupling of the HR and EUSR between 2002-2011. On the other hand, the 
norms developed at the bureaucratic level appear to have fallen into a form of bureaucratic 
autopilot. Since things are stalling at the political level, bureaucracies continue to work, but this 
does not create the conditions necessary for a resolution to the deadlock.  
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The first part will focus on the disagreement among the principals (i.e., EU and PICSB members) 
and show how their identities influence their stances on closing the OHR. More specifically, it 
will demonstrate how their identities affect their perception of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in 
turn, their positions on the future of the international community’s role there. The second part 
addresses the role of bureaucratic norms in prolonging the deadlock and how the Bosnian elites 
benefit from the deadlock and hence do not want it to be resolved. 
   
Bosnia’s Uniqueness? 
 
Former High Representative Paddy Ashdown refers to divergent culture and attitudes when 
comparing the EU to the US in Bosnia and Herzegovina:  
The EU could […] afford to be much more muscular in the application of 
conditionality for the huge sums of aid it hands out. The United States 
does this far better. Its aid is less than that of the EU in, for instance, the 
Balkans, but it is often able to lever more reform than Europe for what it 
dispenses, because US is much more straightforward about the conditions 
it attaches to its giving (Ashdown 2007, 203).  
 
According to Peter (2014), this division between the international actors stems from different 
experiences of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
The localized peacebuilders at the OHR, in particular, see patterns in the 
behaviour of local politicians, worrying that any appeasement just 
encourages an increasingly radical stance. The EU, on the other hand, 
negotiates with BiH on discrete issue areas, resolving problems one by 
one and treating them as largely technical and unconnected. These two 
approaches are fundamentally opposed, leading to continued 
disagreements (Peter 2015, 139).  
 
Here the central dilemma can be summed up this way: is BiH fundamentally different from the 
other accessing countries? And if so should the international institutions adapt their process in 
order to acknowledge these differences? 
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EU and Bosnia as partners 
The EU usually advocates that despite some differences between BiH and other accessing 
countries, their approach should stay the same. They consider BiH as a partner like all previous 
partner countries in accession (Bassuener and Lyon 2009, 8). When asked about their role in BiH, 
EU officials often limit it to an advisory involvement (Interview JT). An illustration of this 
partner and consultant identity developed by the EU can be taken from the 2006 constitutional 
reforms negotiations, when the European Union solely communicated a preference for the 
approbation by the Bosnian political elites of the new Constitution “that streamlined the process 
of European integration without any significant direct involvement on the part of the EU, and 
without engaging in further discussions. Such a general framework proved insufficient for 
domestic actors who expected a more engaged discussion on the constitutional requirements for 
BiH” (Sebastian 2009b, 348).  
 
It is the Bosnian elites’ responsibility to make changes and not the EU’s. In a revealing statement, 
one EU official admitted: “I have worked in other accession, pre-accession countries. I think the 
EU approach is the right one. If Bosnia and Herzegovina wants to be part of the EU, it should 
reach those standards” (Interview EM). This position is engrained in a conviction that the EU 
process is efficient as proven by the 2004/2007 enlargements. An expert informant underscored 
the assumption among some member-states and the bureaucracy in Brussels, saying “we know 
how to do this, we got the magic formula, all we need to do is apply it, we don’t need to 
experiment, we don’t need to be creative, we have procedure and check-list and we just need to 
have a check-list mentality, go through this regimented procedures” (Interview JT). This 
mentality can be linked to the technical approach identified by Peter, which often relies solely on 
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conditionality, i.e. “a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU 
provides external incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions” 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 670). In fact, the accession process seems to be the only 
policy of the EU toward BiH, and conditionality seems to be the only tool. As Bassuener & Lyon 
(2009) reported from a roundtable on BiH organized by the United States Institute for Peace, 
“[m]ost American participants expressed concern over the opacity of EUSR planning. One stated 
– and many agreed – that the EU didn’t have a true foreign policy toward Bosnia and the Western 
Balkans, but solely an enlargement policy that failed to address many of Bosnia’s unique 
problems” (Bassuener and Lyon 2009, 5).  
 
The major problem with this conditionality tool is the fact that it does not seem to work in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and hence perpetuates the deadlock. This confirms that the position maintained 
by the European Union in Bosnia is not supported by a rational calculation, but rather by an 
ideology. One expert stated during an interview,  
The EU since 2004 has been saying that the transformative power of 
Europe, the pull of Brussels, the magnet of European Union would be 
sufficient for the country to want to reform but there is zero evidence that 
that is happening. But they still continue to say that, because that is their 
ideology. That is their religion, even if there are no facts to support it 
(Interview WQ).  
 
In fact, despite, the absence of progress and even a regression in state-building in 2006 “from 
which [BiH] has not recovered” (Woehrel 2013, 3), the EU has not changed its approach. “We 
just sort of extended our timeline and played around the edges; we never confronted the reality of 
our collective failure and it is mostly the EU failure because the EU is in a dominant position. If 
they want to be dominant then they have to accept the majority of the responsibility for it not 
working” (Interview JT). This statement embodies the deadlock situation as explained by 
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constructivism; the EU’s identity has blinded it to the failure of its policy, and despite the fact 
that it is failing, the policy remains basically the same and in turn prolongs the deadlock. One 
expert posed the following question: “[m]y question to the EU would be: what makes you think 
that the exact same process should work in this country that has had such a different recent past? 
They won’t have an answer, because there is none” (Interview WQ).   
 
As demonstrated by the above discussion, the EU has developed identities for itself and for 
Bosnia that influence its perception of a transition from Dayton to Brussels. These identities have 
been constructed by the EU’s past experiences with accession, especially in Eastern European 
countries. This means that successful integrations substantiate the EU’s claim that there is no 
need to reform its modus operandi. These beliefs have great repercussions on Bosnia’s own 
integration process. Since, Bosnian elites have not responded as planned to the conditions set 
forth, the process is stalled. According to Bieber (2008),  
This failure is rooted in the inability to transfer accession conditionality to 
state-building and in the disjointed and haphazard manner in which state-
building has been pursued by the EU. The challenge of building 
functional states is at the heart of the difficulty of EU integration of the 
Western Balkans (Bieber 2008, 2-3).  
 
The refusal to acknowledge the failure of EU conditionality in Bosnia leads one to the conclusion 
that the pursuit of this path is not based on rational deliberation, but is based rather more on 
convictions about EU and Bosnian identities.  
 
The main reason given by many scholars and observers to the question of why the EU approach 
is not working in BiH is the country’ uniqueness (Sebastian 2009a, 4, Interview WQ). Not only 
because of the war, the number of deaths, and the level of devastation, but also the relationship 
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that Bosnia has had over the past two decades with the international community, particularly with 
the OHR. Some scholars use terms such as trusteeship or protectorate to describe this institutional 
approach (Chandler 2006b).  
OHR as a Protector of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The OHR identity also affects its relations and perceptions of BiH. The main determinant for this 
OHR identity is the fact that this institution was especially designed for Bosnia and is more of a 
protector than a partner (Tirak 2010, 10). The OHR developed an organizational identity based 
on its mandate in the Dayton Peace Agreement, and, in large measure, has had to define its own 
role (Dimitrova 2006, 46). Peter’s discussion of this phenomenon demonstrates how the 
successive interpretation by HRs of Annex X was influencing Bosnian politics:  
The role of locally based international implementers was of crucial 
importance for the development of international priorities and state-
building strategies. Appointment of a new High Representative presented 
a rupture in external state- building, as individuals brought along new 
state-building approaches and a new set of priorities (Peter in Sarajlic 
2011, 60). 
 
 The vagueness of the Peace Accords concerning the mandate of the High Representative and his 
office gave the incumbent the latitude to delineate its responsibilities. As pointed out by 
numerous scholars, the OHR has had difficulties in relinquishing its role as a peacekeeper to 
become a state builder. “At the core of the international community's frustration with Bosnia is 
the fact that ending wars and making peace inherently require different strategies and diverse 
international solutions” (McMahon 2004, 592).  
 
In contrast to the EU’s ‘one size fits all’ approach, the OHR is an ad hoc organization tailored for 
post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. The OHR is mentioned in the BiH constitution, and when 
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we look at the 900 interventions made by High Representatives through the Bonn powers since 
1997, we have to concede that the OHR is an integral part of the Bosnian political system (Eralp 
2012, 50). While the EU who only advises and recommends, the OHR is more interested “in 
having an outcome” (Sebastian 2009b, 349) and therefore is more direct in its relationship with 
Bosnian elites. For example, High Representatives like Paddy Ashdown have adopted this 
aggressive approach in the past. Peter describes Ashdown’ style in the following terms: “Ideally, 
local authorities would compromise and pass the reforms; as that had not been the case, the 
HiRep had the option of carrying out the threat he had issued in his December speech and adopt 
them himself” (Peter in Sarajlic 2011, 53). Therefore it is not surprising that one of the OHR’s 
greatest proponents is the United States, “well known for taking a more forceful, hands-on 
approach” (Sebastian 2009a, 3) toward Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
The main problem with this protector identity is the fact that it often glosses over the democratic 
process. Knaus & Martin (2003) discuss the international intervention in Bosnia and comment on 
the “unlimited authority of an international mission to overrule all of the democratic institutions 
of a sovereign member state of the United Nations” (Knaus and Martin 2003, 60). Chandler 
(2004) concurs in underlining the discrepancy between the objective and the method; the 
international community wants to establish democracy in Bosnia, but uses dictatorial means to do 
so (Chandler 2004, 578).  
 
As Sebastian (2009b) points out, this group recognizes Bosnia as being fundamentally different 
from previous accession countries (Sebastian 2009b, 342), but in so doing, it always tailored 
solutions for BiH that were rarely domestically owned. Examples of this pattern are numerous. 
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First, the peace agreement was signed under great pressures from the United States, and it was 
drafted by US State Department lawyers (Bieber 2008, 3) in English to be later translated into 
Serbo-Croat. Second, the 1997 decision to grant the Bonn powers to the OHR was made without 
any consultation (Zaum 2006, 460). The OHR has developed its identity in close relation with 
post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. This approach is more adapted to BiH realities, but also 
less considerate of democratic processes.  
 
Because these two identities are so different from each other and hold such dissimilar views and 
relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is difficult for them to work in cooperation. The OHR 
adapts to the specificities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU uses the same modus operandi it 
uses in other accessing countries. Hence, the OHR works on its projects and its mandates, while 
the EU does the same, but there is no real political collaboration (Interview WQ). The two are 
therefore never forced to acknowledge the differences in their approaches nor to resolve them. 
Unfortunately, recognizing and addressing these issues might be the only way to resolve the 
deadlock. The transition from Dayton to Brussels necessitates a greater harmonization of the 
OHR and EU’s efforts.  
 
Despite dissimilar identities and ideas about Bosnia, these international actors remain motivated 
by the same objective. These are mainly Western countries that advocate for Bosnia’s integration 
into the Euro-Atlantic alliance. They both agree that Bosnia might be different from previous 
accessing countries, but its place is in the European Union. As argued in the next section, this 
belief in EU integration has become a mantra of the international community in Bosnia.  
 57 
According to Majstorovic, the limited differences between the OHR and the EU are reinforced by 
similar strategies. For example, the OHR also uses a conditionality strategy. Majstorovic (2007) 
analyzed 1083 OHR press releases from 2000 to 2005 and he found a repeating pattern of “if you 
don’t . . . then, […] organized around a spatio-temporal axis: the spatial part referring to Bosnia 
geographically being in Europe as a center, but being ‘an abandoned backyard’ or periphery, and 
the temporal part referring to acceleration of the ‘progress’ process” (Majstorovic 2007, 645). If 
their identities, strategies, and ideas are not that far apart, one can conclude that the deadlock 
cannot be understood solely through a constructivist approach.  
Bureaucratic Norms Influence  
 
Constructivism can also be helpful to illuminate some of the bureaucratic norms developed in the 
international community working in Sarajevo. This section draws heavily on the work of Barnett 
& Finnemore (2004), which is based on the premise that international organizations can be 
studied as bureaucracies, i.e. as “a distinctive social form of authority with its own internal logic 
and behavioral proclivities” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 3). Impersonal rules are essential to 
bureaucracies, since these create the actors, their tasks, their organizations, and, in fact, a whole 
social world. At the same time, these rules can also create flaws and dysfunctions.  
 
In the BiH international community, the bureaucratic rules have limited the options available to 
them and to Bosnia. One expert interviewee referred to the limited creativity of the international 
community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Interview JT). This lack of innovation has allowed the 
deadlock to endure, because in the absence of any other option the international bureaucracies in 
BiH have relied on a bureaucratic autopilot (Interview JT). Likewise, Bassuener (2012) argues,  
EU in particular, contributed in a major way to the prevailing dynamic. 
The widely held view that the “pull of Brussels” would obviate the need 
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for the hard-power Dayton enforcement instruments of the Office of the 
High Representative and a Chapter 7-mandated EUFOR was proven false 
by the end of 2006. Yet it remains the foundation of the current policy. So 
while the Dayton rules remain legally valid, there is no political appetite 
to enforce those rules, nor to create a conducive environment for a new 
constitutional incentive structure. This bureaucratic autopilot will lead to 
disaster for Bosnia and the EU – it is only a matter of time (Bassuener 
2012, 1). 
 
Any changes in policy must be channelled through the rules and practices already in place in the 
OHR and EU. This is in line with the argument of Barnett & Finnemore (2004) that 
“[b]ureaucracies encode experience into their governing rules and standard operating procedures, 
which strongly discourage some types of change and make others more likely. Any attempts at 
change must be filtered through that accretion” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 9). The possible 
changes in Bosnia’s international community have been limited, and have made the option of 
prolonging the transition from Dayton to Brussels more likely (Peter 2013, 434). One norm that is 
particularly interesting in this respect in BiH is claiming the inevitability of Bosnia’s EU 
integration, a solution that is seen as its sole option. The internalization of this norm has had 
counter-productive effects on Bosnian elites and therefore on the work of the international 
community. Over and over again, the High Representative and the Special Representative have 
spoken of the inescapability of Bosnia and Herzegovina becoming a full-member of the European 
Union sooner or later. One of the many examples of this is expressed in this quote from an OHR 
official: “[a]ll segments of the international community has consensus that the only place for BiH 
is in the European Union. I believe that; I want that. There is no doubt that that is the goal and the 
consensus is 100% on that.  And how that plays out in the future is again this slow unclear way of 
transitioning more to the EU way and less from the Dayton way” (Interview RP).  
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Bosnian elites know that they only have to wait to become a EU member state; that they can sit 
out the international community. As noted by one expert during an interview, the Bosnian 
politicians have no incentives to change,  
if it is inevitable why should the country change, right? I mean if 
everyone is telling you all the time, “but of course you are going be in 
Europe.” Then why would you want to change your rule of law? Why 
would you want an independent media? Why would you an independent 
justice sector? Why would you want to do anything hard if it is inevitable? 
[…] So it is perfect to be a politician, so you can go on TV and say “oh 
yes, we want Europe, we want Europe.” But never need to do anything to 
have it happen, because you know it is not going to happen while you are 
in power. So you sort of continue to steal everything you can, abuse, give 
your sons and daughters jobs while knowing that at the end of the day you 
are not going to be responsible for actually enforcing the reforms and they 
are going to be hard (Interview WQ).  
 
Thus, “[b]ureaucracies can become obsessed with their own rules at the expense of their primary 
missions in ways that produce inefficient and self-defeating outcomes” (Barnett and Finnemore 
2004, 3) like deadlocks. The norms set out by the international community for Bosnia, and those 
developed by the international bureaucracies working in Bosnia, have been self-defeating and 
instead of resolving the impasse have allowed it to persist.  
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Conclusion 
 
At the bureaucratic level, the constructivist explanation seems sufficiently robust. When we 
analyse the culture, the norms and the identities developed by the OHR and EU bureaucracies, we 
can understand how the deadlock is perpetuated. EU integration has become the only practicable 
option. Hence, both local and international elites seem to be waiting for this solution to come 
true, in the meantime relying on a bureaucratic autopilot.  
 
Despite some strong arguments, constructivism might not be able to explain the deadlock to its 
fullest. Indeed, if constructivism has been able to a certain extent to explain continuity in the 
Bosnian international community, it could just as well explain changes. Changes could lead the 
transition to an end by closing the OHR and letting the EU take over. First, these partner and 
protector identities are not completely dissimilar. Despite some major differences, the fact 
remains that both the OHR and the EU share the same goal for Bosnia and Herzegovina. They 
both want BiH to integrate the Euro-Atlantic alliance in joining the EU and NATO. The partner 
and protector roles might not be that far apart, but rather nuances in the perspective of a western-
style liberal democratic Bosnia. In fact, according to Sebastian (2009) they can be compatible: 
“what Bosnia requires is a combination of the EU and US approaches, namely long-term 
engagement with a hands-on strategy” (Sebastian 2009a, 5). One interview suggested a clearer 
task division to combine the two approaches (Interview WQ).  Second, the norms developed at 
the operational level could be altered by a political impulse rooting for change. It seems obvious 
from my interviews that the people working on the ground are willing to see things evolve in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they are often pull back by political and institutional constraints 
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(Interview JT). The bureaucratic autopilot is not a permanent phenomenon and could be 
dismantle and replace by a more creative and collaborative approach.  
Constructivism, like rationalism, is able to explain partly the perpetuation of the deadlock. In fact, 
constructivism is particularly able to explain the dynamics in the bureaucracies and the 
organizational approaches of the OHR and the EU.   
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Regime Complexity 
 
The third and last explanatory framework tested in this thesis is known as regime complexity. 
The concept of regime complexity draws on the idea that complexity has explanatory power, 
“complexity is causally important in how it affects the strategies and dynamic interactions of 
actors” (Alter and Meunier 2009). In this view, if we want to explain actors’ decisions, we must 
take into account the political environment created by complexity “that alters the behaviour and 
political salience of states, IOs, and sub-states actors” (Alter and Meunier 2009, 21). This section 
will test whether the regime complexity framework can explain the deadlock among international 
actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Compared to rationalism and constructivism, regime complexity is still a somewhat marginal 
trend in international relations, but it is growing in popularity and its appropriateness to the 
present case makes it a good candidate to explain the deadlock. In fact, contrary to the other two 
frameworks, regime complexity can make substantive claims about who and what should be 
studied. To begin with, drawing on complexity studies in various disciplines, Alter & Meunier 
(2009) concur with the basic understanding that “units does not sum up the whole and that the 
dynamics of the whole shape the behavior of units and sub-parts” (Alter and Meunier 2009, 15). 
Based on their recommendation, this thesis assesses the dynamics between the OHR and EU 
instead of examining them independently. The rationale here is that complexity can prolong 
missions by dissipating efforts and preventing organizations from achieving their goals 
completely. While complexity does not automatically entail inefficiencies (e.g., deadlocks), it 
does increase coordination costs (Brosig 2011). Cooperation is therefore more difficult and 
competition and ambiguity can arise.  
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Regime complexity emerges from the exponential growth of international treaties, arrangements, 
and institutions. A consequence of this growth is that institutions end up overlapping whereby 
numerous institutions may administer one issue. Scholars became interested in the effects of this 
complexity and how it changes actors’ importance and interactions. They have moved away from 
the conception of international regimes as “self-contained or stand-alone arrangements that can 
be analysed in isolation from one another” and have developed an understanding of “the nature 
and consequences of institutional linkages at the international level” (Young 1996, 1). The 
difficulty is that, in complex environments, causality is fuzzy; one must be careful and not reduce 
or homogenize actors or their interests (Alter and Meunier 2009, 21). 
This section has two main parts. The first part is dedicated to establishing that the network of 
international institutions in BiH constitutes a regime complexity environment. While 
constructivist and rationalist perspectives do not offer substantive theories of world politics 
(Fearon and Wendt 2002, 56), regime complexity takes place in a specific setting that we ought 
primarily to acknowledge. The second part will then presents the relationship between the 
deadlock and regime complexity. The aim here is to demonstrate how the institutional structure 
itself contributes to the deadlock.  
International Community as a Regime Complex 
 
This section discusses the notions of regime complex and regime complexity in relation to the 
situation of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Raustiala & Victor (2004) 
coined the term “regime complex” to designate “an array of partially overlapping and 
nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area” (Raustiala and Victor 2004). The 
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density of international arrangements generates contacts among various regimes. They use the 
case of plant genetic resources, “[r]ather than a single, discrete regime governing [plant genetic 
resources], the relevant rules are found in at least five clusters of international legal agreements—
what we call elemental regimes—as well as in national rules within key states, especially the 
United States and the European Union” (Raustiala and Victor 2004, 278).  
 
Alter & Meunier (2009) prefer the notion of international regime complexity, which “refers to the 
presence of nested, partially overlapping and parallel international regimes that are not 
hierarchically ordered” (Alter and Meunier 2009, 13). They argue that the anarchic nature of 
international relations highlights the salience of the concept of complexity, “making it harder to 
resolve where political authority over an issue resides” (Alter and Meunier 2009, 13).  
 
The two concepts are interrelated. While regime complexes are specific networks of regimes that 
form around a particular issue, regime complexity refers to an environment or milieu in which 
complexity is a defining feature; it refers to the larger phenomenon. One could argue, for instance, 
that regime complexity generates regime complexes. With the proliferation of rules and 
institutional arrangements, the global village is more and more crowded and fosters the gathering 
of regimes around specific issues. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s international community has 
experienced regime complexity. In turn, the concentration of international agencies, institutions, 
and organizations in a small location has created a regime complex of its own revolving around 
BiH itself.  
 
We can now address the specifics of the regime complex and examine whether the international 
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community characteristics match the description. Orsini, Morin, & Young (2013) developed a 
definition for regime complexes, which identified their fundamental characteristics. In their view, 
a regime complex “contains three or more international regimes, relates to a common subject 
matter, exhibit overlapping membership; and generate substantive, normative, or operative 
interactions recognized as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effectively” 
(Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013, 29). This definition will be used to determine whether Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’s international community corresponds to a regime complex.  
First, in order to address this, we must consider the meaning of regimes, which are generally 
described as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 
1983, 2). Several treaties, institutions, and international governmental organizations (IGOs) can 
be part of the same regime. To go from the presence of multiple regimes to regime complexes, 
however, there must be some level of divergence among three or more regimes. In regime 
complexes, interactions must be at least potentially problematic. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a site 
where organizations pertaining to different international regimes intersect. If we take only the 
regular participants in the Board of Directors weekly meeting, which includes the most important 
IOs working in BiH, the majority of them were implemented at Dayton. Thus, we can already 
identify institutions relating to different regimes. The United Nations Development Program and 
Human Rights Council are present in Bosnia to foster and monitor the progress of the country 
and they belong, respectively, to the UN’s development and human rights complexes. The 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, for their part, relate to the economic regime. 
Also, NATO and EUFOR Althea, the military branch of the international community, can be 
considered as elements of the international security regime and still maintain active headquarters 
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in BiH to assist in reforming the country’s defence policy. Therefore, it is clear that that parts of 
international regimes interact in the small-scale environment provided by Bosnia, which qualifies 
this international community as a regime complex.  
According to Orsini, Morin and Young (2013), in this context, practitioners and observers, must 
acknowledge the presence of at least potentially problematic regimes. In interviews, experts and 
officials from both the EU and OHR have repeatedly recognized the potentially contentious 
nature of the relations among the institutions in BiH (Interviews AS and RP). Ashdown (2007) 
refers to the conflicting relations between the military and civil components of the peace 
implementation mission: “relations between the two headquarters had been at best minimal and at 
worst (as with my predecessor) cool to the point of hostility” (Ashdown 2007, 218). Even at the 
fieldwork level, those regimes can clash and be problematic.  
Secondly, Orsini, Morin, & Young claim that “regime complexes focus on a specific subject 
matter, often narrower in scope than an issue area” (Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013, 30). 
Although the majority of scholars studying regime complexity undertake their research with an 
issue oriented focus rather than geographical focus, I argue that Bosnia and Herzegovina can be 
studied as a subject matter. It can be explored as an empirical case like maritime piracy or food-
security, because it is a limited topic both in terms of scope and space and it exhibits the defining 
features of regime complex.  
The third attribute of a regime complex identified by Orsini, Morin, and Young has to do with its 
overlapping membership. The international organizations in BiH fit this characteristic. If we 
consider only the two institutions at the center of this thesis (EU and OHR), it is clear their 
principals share some members. In fact, five PICSB participants are also EU member-states or 
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institutions, namely the EU Commission, EU Presidency, France, United Kingdom, and Germany. 
Sharing membership allows for chessboard politics, like “cross-institutional political strategies 
where actors promoted agenda across multiple international institutions to influence policy 
outcomes” (Alter and Meunier 2009, 16).  
Fourth, according to Orsini, Morin and Young’s definition, regimes must also interact on some 
level, although the scope and extent of this are not specified. In the BiH international community, 
there are interactions happening at every level. As Biermann (2007) points out, 
Today, all the Euro-Atlantic security institutions regularly meet, on the 
working level almost on a daily basis, to coordinate a wide range of issues 
centering on crisis management. Most of them have concluded framework 
agreements identifying the modalities of cooperation. They cooperate 
among the headquarters and, even more, in the field—the multifunctional 
peace building operations in Bosnia and Kosovo involving all these 
organizations are the best-known examples (Biermann 2007, 152). 
In conclusion, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s international community can be considered a regime 
complex, which emerged from the regime complexity developed by the arrangements brought 
about by the Dayton Peace Agreement. The absence of centralized governance of the various 
regimes intensifies this complexity. On this point, Peter (2015) claims,  
In order to remedy the duplication of efforts the international community 
should appoint a lead agency for the overall mission. This addresses the 
question of duplication of efforts and discourages agencies from trying to 
take the lead on the ground, as has often been the case in BiH. These 
efforts inevitably result in turf wars between various agencies with each of 
them having their work undermined by others (Peter 2015, 146).  
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Deadlock Explained by Regime Complexity 
 
Having established that the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be 
understood as a regime complex, we are now in a position to consider how regime complexity 
theory can help explain the deadlock. In what follows, we will draw on one of the major 
contributions to the literature on regime complexity: the symposium organized by Karen Alter 
and Sophie Meunier. More specifically, we will look at Stephanie Hofmann’s article (2009), 
which focuses on NATO and the ESDP. Hofmann observes that despite great overlaps in 
“membership, mandate, and resources” (Hofmann 2009, 46) between those two crisis 
management organizations, genuine cooperation is not present. She notices that the policies 
adopted in reaction to these overlaps has resulted in a lack of coordination, which “has created 
inefficiencies in the crisis management interventions of each institution, including delays in troop 
deployment and a lack of strategic guidance in operations” (Hofmann 2011, 114). The 
inefficiencies in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina have caused the deadlock.  
 
This section is comprised of three subsections that connect the overlapping institutional 
dimensions suggested by Hofmann in relation to the propositions of Alter and Meunier in their 
introduction Politics of Regime Complexity. We will examine each dimension separately and in 
relation to Bosnia’s deadlock in order to demonstrate how regime complexity principles can be 
applied to this case.  
Membership 
As discussed above, partially shared membership is an important feature of overlapping regimes. 
According to Orsini, Morin and Young (2013), considering membership “is also useful reminder 
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that IGOs are not the only actors actively shaping them” (Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013, 31). 
There are two main strategies influenced by complexity that affect principals’ actions.   
First, there is a cross-institutional political strategy “where actors promoted agenda across 
multiple international institutions to influence policy outcomes” (Alter and Meunier 2009, 16). 
As with NATO and ESDP, the OHR and EU shared members lobby in both forums to achieve 
their desired outcomes. For example, the policies espoused by Berlin influence both the OHR and 
EU decisions in the deadlock situation. According Weber, Berlin influence in both forums results 
in weak and ineffective international policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He points out that in the 
PICSB, “Berlin has begun pushing for the OHR to be defunded and moved, amounting to 
transition by stealth” (Weber 2012, 14). However, the United States and Turkey have firmly 
vetoed the proposal to completely close the OHR, allowing the institution to remain open but in a 
diminished and discredited capacity. Meanwhile, in the EU, the policy developed by Germany 
has consisted in applying the integration toolbox without considering the particularities of Bosnia, 
as seen in the constructivism section. Thus, Berlin policy has “aimed at eroding both the OHR 
and the 5+2 agenda without being forced to forge unity among EU and PIC member states” 
(Weber 2012, 14). The absence of consensus among international principals perpetuates the 
deadlock, because the push-and-pull strategy within the EU and PICSB never allows the 
international community to achieve its goals.  
Second, Alter & Meunier (2009) point out that clashes between actors’ preferences “ended up 
shaping the policies adopted in each institution, making them vaguer than originally intended” 
(Alter and Meunier 2009, 17). Hofmann identifies this notion as ‘strategic ambiguity’. In Bosnia, 
the press releases issued by international overseers prove that their divisions have resulted in 
vagueness. This ambiguity is detrimental to the effectiveness of the international intervention and 
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especially to the credibility of their representatives. For example, the last PICSB common 
position only reaffirmed the same mantra of wishing for a democratic, stable, and viable Bosnia 
and Herzegovina without giving any specifics other than the 5+2 agenda. Moreover, an 
addendum is often added at the end of official PICSB communiqués, indicating that Russia 
declined or tempered its support for the general position. The consequence of this is that despite 
the reiteration of PIC support for the OHR, the international community looks divided and 
irresolute in the eyes of Bosnian elites and the public. The inconsistency of positions concerning 
the future of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina has left the transition in 
limbo (Interview AS). In other words, disagreements among the international community have 
coerced their representatives and offices into inactivity. An expert informant told us: “there is not 
a unified support for [the High Representative] authority, his office’s authority, he has felt 
disempowered to use his authority, but instead of testing the limits of his authority, he is just 
basically putting the onus on the PIC to pull the leach; he has been obliging to their constraints” 
(Interview JT).  
 
To conclude, the pressures applied by the principals in defending their own positions in context 
where they belong to various organizations as well as the indecisive nature of their 
communication and support to their Representatives contribute to the difficulty of the transition.  
Mandate 
The second overlap identified by Hofmann relates to mandates. NATO and ESDP mandates do 
not stipulate a functional or geographic division of labour, and they both refer to crisis 
management. Analogously, international mandates in Bosnia and Herzegovina are deeply 
intertwined. The mandates granted on paper, however, can be sorted out later during their 
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execution. Accordingly, Alter & Meunier remind us about the importance of the implementation 
phase over the negotiations phase. They argue that there are discrepancies between the authors 
who originally designed the agreement and its actual implementation by agents, and they suggest 
that the priorities and preferences of the latter are different from those of the negotiators. This 
section will discuss both the original agreements and their implementation to examine how 
complexity has affected the deadlock.   
The most important document for the international intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
undoubtedly the Dayton Peace Agreement. It was signed to end the war, but as confirmed by 
numerous experts and practitioners, it was not as effective in peace building (Chandler 2006b, 
17). First, the Dayton Agreement is open-ended. The OHR has the power to define and delimit 
his own role, and there was no clear timeline associated with the international intervention. The 
situation is similar to the one described by Brosig (2011) in his article on the interplay of 
international institutions in Kosovo. The number of international institutions involved grows 
because no one is leaving, so institutions just add up on top of each other, and, in so doing, 
increase in complexity (Brosig 2011, 192). Second, Dayton did not create a clear division of 
labour among international institutions. For example, Dayton gave the responsibility for 
education, human rights and democratization to both the OHR and the OSCE.  
The complexity created by the Dayton agreement and the multiplication of international 
institutions cannot be resolved by a treaty or written agreement, which leaves people working in 
those institutions to find ways of dividing labour themselves. Paddy Ashdown describes this 
clearly in his memoirs:  
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Most of these [international administrations] had muddled and 
overlapping mandates. Although the Dayton Agreement gave the High 
Representative the task of coordination within the international 
community, he had no powers to enforce this. The result was duplication 
of the international effort, confusion amongst the Bosnians and the severe 
dissipation of the energies of the overall international effort (Ashdown 
2007, 36). 
 This waste of time and effort has prolonged the deadlock and the mandate of some international 
organizations, because their tasks have not yet been fulfilled and they even have taken up new 
missions. For example, since 2008, the closure of the OHR depends partially on the attainment of 
EU requirements. Tirak (2010) identified the new mandates endorsed by the OHR in comparing 
the original Dayton agreement and the 5+2 plan.  
If we examine the benchmarks of the 5+2 package, it becomes apparent 
that some have very little to do with the Dayton Agreement. In fact, some 
of the objectives – for example the establishment of a National Fiscal 
Council – were taken from different EU documents, such as the European 
Partnership with Bosnia, which has nothing to do with the OHR’s 
mandate. Dayton gradually became subordinate to the requirements for 
eventual EU membership, and its unfulfilled parts have been left in the 
shadows of the 5+2 agenda. Not surprisingly, the PIC’s 5+2 conditionality 
was fully embraced by the EU – the EU shaped some of its requirements 
(Tirak 2010, 5).  
These overlapping mandates can create inefficiencies, involving turf battles, the duplication of 
work, and uncoordinated policies (Alter and Meunier 2009, 19). These inefficiencies prolong 
mandates. Organizations may spend time defending their turf or doubling the same work, which 
dissipates resources and time. In Bosnia, these longer mandates have contributed to the 
continuation of the deadlock.  
Assets 
The third and most significant overlap for Hofmann consists of assets sharing. The assets overlap 
between NATO and ESDP is most visible in comprehensive missions, which necessitate both 
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military and civil components. The Berlin Plus agreement was designed to regulate the exchange 
between the two institutions. Asset sharing is less formalized in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
international community, but there is valuable material, which could be the object of a more 
systemic exchange agreement. According to one expert informant, who commented on expertise 
sharing, “[the EU] don’t want to deal with [the OHR], don’t want their expertise. For example the 
legal department drafted a lot of the laws and the institutional framework of the country in terms 
of things that were adopted after Dayton, EU doesn’t want to touch that” (Interview JT).  
Still, in the ESDP/NATO case, like in the OHR/EU one, “there are number of ambiguities […] 
that have given rise to conflicting interpretations” (Hofmann 2009, 46). These ambiguities leave 
the details to be sorted out on a more operational level, and in both cases it has created 
impediments to a formal and genuine cooperation. Indeed, Hofmann (2009) argues, “people on 
the ground, constrained by mandates that reflect divisions among member states, cannot fully 
compensate for the absence of strategic cooperation at higher levels” (Hofmann 2009, 48). This is 
also applicable to BiH. During our interviews, both OHR and EU officials attested to the 
seriousness of the cooperation between their departments. One OHR official told me: “[t]he 
degree of cooperation with the EU is very high, meaning we have daily contact and our 
counterparts in the EU, we always agree before what to do next and we don’t do something until 
we agree. […] we are effectively, virtually one team” (interview RP). By contrast, the EU 
counterpart claimed: “as things come up, we agree to meet on different issues. If he can give out 
advice on something I am working on and vice versa. If I can add something on what he is doing, 
he will contact me” (Interview EM). Nevertheless, this cooperation seems to be highly variable 
from department to department, and it appears that there is no general framework of coordination 
between the OHR and the EU.  
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The absence of a formal agreement over the sharing of assets ultimately produces the same result 
as having an ambiguous agreement. Therefore the ESDP/NATO relationship looks more like the 
OHR/EU than one would otherwise think. EU/OHR political interactions end up being sterile. 
The weekly meetings of the Board of Directors, an initiative started in 2002 to help international 
organizations in BiH discuss and coordinate similar mandates, has not produced—at least in 
terms of public image—a united international community. This is illustrated by the fact that there 
has been not been a common press release since 2004, and before that only three were listed on 
the OHR official website.  
Again like the ESDP and NATO case, the relations between the OHR and EU cannot be 
considered fully cooperative nor, on the contrary, totally competitive; rather we can characterize 
it as an ‘ambiguous relationship’. This relationship offers great examples of coordination, but it 
can also exhibit degrees of competition. As mentioned by Alter & Meunier (2009),  
where organizations are competing, actors lack an incentive to coordinate 
their efforts, thereby generating the types of persistent inefficiencies 
frequently lamented, such as repetitive efforts, turf battles, and 
uncoordinated policy which has achievements by one organization later 
undermined and erased (Alter and Meunier 2009, 19).  
We suggest that, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of these inefficiencies certainly 
consists of the perpetuation of deadlock. Through competition, institutions move away from their 
primary objectives and are less effective in carrying out their missions. One expert informant 
noted, “everybody is working on their self-defined role, which means a lot of things fall through 
the cracks. There is competition, which is stupid quite often, and a waste of time and a waste of 
taxpayers’ money as well as being actively counter-productive quite often” (Interview JT). In 
examining assets sharing between the OHR and the EU in BiH, one can notice that, at the 
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operational level, information and expertise is often exchanged, although this cannot compensate 
for the absence of coordination at higher levels.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the regime complexity theory offers a new perspective on the causes of deadlock 
in the Bosnia and Herzegovina international community. While complexity is not necessarily 
related with inefficiencies, it certainly makes coordination among actors more difficult. In turn, a 
lack of coordination extends the time and resources needed to accomplish a task. Further, 
overlaps in terms of membership, mandates, and assets reveal how complexity has affected actors’ 
behaviours. As Alter & Meunier (2009) note, “[s]ometimes overlap introduces positive feedback 
effects that enhance cooperation and the effectiveness of any one cooperative regime. Sometimes, 
however, complexity introduces unhelpful competition across actors, inefficacies, and transaction 
costs that end up compromising the objectives of international governance” (Alter and Meunier 
2009, 14). In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it has led to nearly a decade of deadlock, in a 
stalled transition between the OHR and the EU. According to Peter (2014), 
the problem of an institutional overlap is difficult to completely eliminate 
in complex peace and state-building operations. Different state-building 
areas are intertwined and agencies implementing them contribute to their 
different aspects. In order to remedy the duplication of efforts the 
international community should appoint a lead agency for the overall 
mission. This addresses the question of duplication of efforts and 
discourages agencies from trying to take the lead on the ground, as has 
often been the case in BiH. These efforts inevitably result in turf wars 
between various agencies with each of them having their work 
undermined by others. When such turf disputes occur throughout a 
transition period, this complicates the extraction of the international state-
building efforts (Peter 2015, 146). 
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While the explanatory potential of regime complexity is interesting, it is also problematic. As 
Alter & Meunier point out, causality is often unclear in complexity studies. Unidirectional effects 
are difficult to identify. We cannot yet say with certainty if the international community regime 
complex is solely responsible for the deadlock. This section, nonetheless, provides some insights 
as to why complexity could be a significant factor in the perpetuation of the deadlock.  
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Chapter Three: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is an excellent laboratory for social sciences, especially political science. 
The microcosm developed in the international community is fascinating, researches have been 
made on peacebuilding and reconstruction, refugee returns, NGOs, police reforms, war criminal 
prosecutions, etc. When looking at the big picture however, the main puzzle remains why is the 
international community still present in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Twenty years after the end of 
the war, BiH is still under international supervision. In the absence of changes in the international 
community, as my research progressed, deadlock came to be the more appropriate notion to 
describe and analyze this situation. Deadlock implies a point in a negotiation where no progress 
can be made. In Bosnia, the transition from the OHR to the EU or from Dayton to Brussels 
necessitates a negotiation between the principals and the organisations and since 2006 there has 
been no change in the situation. Moreover, there is no excepted change in the foreseeable future. 
As long as the international community will not be able to achieve a greater consensus and faced 
its internal challenges, we cannot expect any transformation in the international status of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  
This thesis does not suggest a normative judgement about the deadlock or solutions to solve it. 
The objective is limited to acknowledging the deadlock and trying to explain it. However, one 
must recognize that identifying and understanding the causes can help to find which solutions 
may work. This thesis points the responsibility of international administrations in the 
prolongation of their own mandates. It may seem surprising that this thesis does not analyse the 
responsibilities of Bosnian politicians and elites in the perpetuation of the international 
supervision. As mentioned in the constructivist section, the Bosnian political elites cannot be 
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absolved from all responsibility in Bosnia’s absence of progress. Nonetheless, the staled 
transition from Dayton to Brussels is primarily caused by a disagreement between the two main 
international institutions in BiH. In fact, Bosnians have little if nothing to say in the prolongation 
of the OHR mission, the same goes for the EU implication.  
This thesis tested three hypotheses able to explain the deadlock. These frameworks were selected 
for their suitability. Rationalism and constructivism are not substantive frameworks, which can 
explain a large variety of situations. Both have tools that can illuminate some aspects and actors 
of the Bosnian international community. For its part, regime complexity suits Bosnia and 
Herzegovina international community well, because it can be consider as a regime complex and 
therefore we can use some of the causalities suggested by regime complexity authors to explain 
the deadlock. While it cannot determine with absolute certainty which explanation is the best, it 
uncovers that each frameworks might correspond to specific actors or focuses on the situation.  
Rationalism is especially suitable to explain the principals’ behaviours. The actions of the PIC 
steering board members, the EU member-states and institutions are easier to understand using the 
tools of rationalism, especially game theory. By dividing the interests of the principals in two 
camps, we can assess the reasons for the deadlock. On the one hand, the pro-EU camp wants to 
enhance EU prestige and security by speeding Bosnia EU integration. On the other hand, the pro-
OHR group fear that violence could resume in Bosnia without the enforcing powers of the OHR. 
Rationalism elegantly and brilliantly encompasses the negotiations between these two groups 
with irreconcilable views on the future of Bosnia.  
Constructivism, for its part, rightly captures the effects of norms and identities on the main 
international actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Differentiated identities forged by the EU and the 
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OHR make them work in parallel rather than cooperatively at the political level. Hence, the 
deadlock problem is never seriously faced and dealt with. Besides, norms are deeply related to 
the bureaucratic cultures. In absence of cooperation at the political level, bureaucracies have fall 
back into an autopilot. They cooperate on the operational, however there is a lack of creativity, 
preventing deadlock resolution. Constructivism explains how the deadlock has been able to last 
as long. Norms and identities can change and evolve, but they can also be factors of continuity 
(Fearon and Wendt 2002, 57).   
Regime complexity literature has not yet developed clear causality indicating the effects of 
complexity. However, articles such as Hofmann’s allow deducting some of the consequences of 
the overlaps between two institutions in terms of membership, mandates, and assets. The EU and 
the OHR overlap in many ways and as for NATO and ESDP, this led to inefficiencies, such as 
the deadlock. Regime complexity offers a global understanding of interactions among 
international actors where “the relationship […] is characterized by neither outright cooperation 
nor competition. […] Competition arises through turf battles and hostage taking as state 
maneuver within each organization to promote their specific policy preferences even as a certain 
degree of cooperation is achieved by muddling through”(Hofmann 2009, 49). 
 
The limited time and resources allocated to a master thesis research did not allow for a full 
comparative argument to determine, which one of the three frameworks can best explain the 
deadlock. The tentative conclusion remains that each one can be suitable depending on the actors 
or on the focus. Even if the generalization potential is quite low, being based on only one case 
study. Extrapolations to other cases of international administrations are difficult to achieve. 
Moreover, BiH international administration exhibits specific features, such as a UN delegated 
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willing group of countries as administrators, post-ethnic conflict, and international supervision 
enshrined in the state constitution. This paper could however be the basis for other studies of 
prolonged international administrations. The more and more accepted notion of rebuilding 
responsibility in post-war period will inevitability produce other international administrations. 
Hence, it is important for scholar to understand the creation, the operation but also the exit-
strategies of those international interventions. This thesis was a small step included in a much 
greater effort to do so.   
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